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Access to Essential Medicines
Bryan Mercurio *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Over the last decade, public health and development issues have become topics of
great international concern. Public health in many parts of the world has reached crisis
level: Over 14 million people are killed by infectious diseases each year (90% of which
are in the developing world); over 40 million people globally are infected with
HIV/AIDS (90% of which are in the developing world) and the disease kills over three
million people annually; over 500 million people are infected with malaria each year and
the disease kills upwards of two million people annually; over eight million people
develop active tuberculosis (TB) each year and the disease kills over two million people
annually (95% of those afflicted and 99% of deaths resulting from TB are found in the
developing world ) 1 Hundreds of thousands more people die each year from other, lesser
known, diseases which predominantly affect developing countries. 2
Perhaps even more alarming is the fact that while most illnesses – especially
infectious diseases – are preventable or treatable with existing medicines, the World
Health Organization (WHO) estimates that over 1.7 billion people – nearly one-third of
the world’s population – have inadequate or no access to these essential medicines. 3
*
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1
See M ÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES [Doctors without Borders] (MSF), M ILLIONS HAVE A DRUG
PROBLEM: THEY CAN’T GET A NY 6-7 (2004), available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/campaignbrochure2004.pdf [hereinafter MSF 2004]; UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT ,
PRESCRIPTION FOR HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT : INCREASING A CCESS TO M EDICINES, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON HIV/AIDS, M ALARIA , TB, AND A CCESS TO ESSENTIAL M EDICINES, PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT : INCREASING A CCESS TO ESSENTIAL M EDICINES 26 (Beryl Leach et al. eds.,
2005), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/TF5-medicines-Complete.pdf
[hereinafter UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005].
2
For instance, lesser known diseases such as the African trypanosomiasis, Chagas, leishmaniasis, and
dengue fever also kill thousands of people each year. See MSF 2004, supra note 1, at 7. See generally
PHILIP STEVENS, DISEASES OF POVERTY AND THE 10/90 GAP (2004).
3
W ORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), THE W ORLD M EDICINES SITUATION 61 (2004), available at
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Reports_World_Medicines_Situation.pdf [hereinafter WHO 2004]. A
WHO study conducted in 1999 reveals that low-income countries make up approximately 80% of those
persons without sufficient access to essential medicines. Id. The problem is most severe in India and Africa,
which make up 53% of those individuals without sufficient access to essential medicines. Id. It must be
noted that in percentage terms, the situation has improved over the last thirty years (in 1975, less than 50%
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Moreover, another study recently found that 10 million children a year die from
preventable diseases and conditions, with almost all these deaths occur ring in poor
nations. 4 Another stud y found that prompt diagnosis and treatment of health problems in
Africa and Southeast Asia alone could save approximately 4 million lives each year. 5 In
addition, resistance to existing treatments due to improper use or over-exposure plays a
significant role in increasing the severity of the public health crises in many nations. 6
Other studies link health with the economic prosperity of nations and persuasively
demonstrate the dramatic role the HIV/AIDS epidemic has played in the declining
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 7 The consequences of the vicious cycle between
poverty and illness are clear8 and the situation will become even more untenable unless
the world comes together to resolve the public health crisis engulfing much of the
developing world.
Fortunately, and in large part due to the tireless efforts of several well- funded nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), 9 health-related issues of developing countries, and
of people had regular access to essential medicines). However, due to population growth, the actual number
of persons without access to essential medicines has remained at approximately 1.7 billion. See id. at 61-63.
4
Robert E. Black et al., Where and Why are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?, 361 The Lancet
2226 (2003). For similar statistics, see U.K. Dept. for Int’l Dev. (DFID), Increasing Access to Essential
Medicines in the Developing World: United Kingdom Government Policy and Plans 7 (2004), available at
www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/accessmedicines.pdf [hereinafter DFID 2004].
5
DFID 2004, supra note 4, at 8.
6
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 26. It is clear that inappropriate use of medicines
leads to resistance. In fact, one study found that in Tanzania, 75% of health workers were dispensing
inappropriate doses of malaria regiments to stretch inadequate supplies. Reducing the required dosage of
malaria treatment induces resistance and is a major cause of the malaria crisis engulfing part of the
developing world. See id. at 88. See also Melinda Pavin et al., Prescribing Practices of Rural Primary
Health Care Physicians in Uzbekistan, 8(2) TROP . M ED. INT ’L HEALTH 182, 182–90 (2003). For
approaches resolving this issue, including acquiring more qualified health workers and dealing with
illiterate users see R.O. Laing et al., Ten Recommendations to Improve Use of Medicines in Developing
Countries, 16(1) HEALTH POLICY PLAN. 13, 13-20 (2001).
7
See generally WHO, W ORLD HEALTH REPORT 2002: REDUCING RISKS, P ROMOTING HEALTHY LIFE
(2002), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02_en.pdf; see also Brazil Ministry of Health,
National AIDS Drug Policy 2001, available at http://www.aids.gov.br/final/biblioteca/drug/drug2.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2007) (linking improved health and prolonged life expectancy to increased productivity,
improved use of resources and lower medical costs). Moreover, life expectancy in Africa increased by nine
years between 1960 and 1990, while life expectancy in high-income countries increased by six years. The
impact of these gains added between 1.7% and 2.7% per annum to the growth rate of per capita GDP.
Recently, however, HIV/AIDS induced a decline in economic welfare approximated at 1.7% per annum,
leading to an overall growth rate of –2.6%. In addition, economic welfare in countries heavily impacted by
AIDS, such as Botswana, decreased by over 8% per annum for the past decade. Dean T. Jamison et al., The
Effect of the AIDS Epidemic on Economic Welfare in Sub-Saharan Africa (Comm’n on Macroeconomics
and Health Working Paper Series, Paper No. WG1: 13, 2001). For more on the linkage between health and
economic prosperity, see, for example W ORLD BANK, W ORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993--INVESTING IN
HEALTH (1993); David E. Bloom & Ajay S. Mahal, Does the AIDS Epidemic Threaten Economic Growth?,
77 J. ECONOMETRICS 105 (1997); William D. Nordhaus, The Health of Nations: The Contribution of
Improved Health to Living Standards (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. W8818, 2002);
John Luke Gallup & Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria (Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard,
Working Paper No. 52, 2000), available at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/052.pdf; WHO, W ORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2000, HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (2000); HEALTH AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Guillem López-Casasnovas et al. eds., 2005).
8
K. Balasubramaniam, Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards under TRIPS, in TRADING IN
KNOWLEDGE : DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 135-42 (Christophe
Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
9
For more information on the work of one such NGO on the issue, see Ruth Mayne, The Global
Campaign on Patents and Access to Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
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more particularly the issue of accessibility to essential medicines, have garnered much
worldwide attention in recent years. 10 Unfortunately, public debate on the issue is most
often limited to blaming the pharmaceutical industry and patent regulations under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 11 for the lack of accessibility and affordability of
much needed drugs in developing countries. While it may be ‘in vogue’ to attack the
pharmaceutical industry, TRIPS and the WTO more generally, 12 such attacks are usually
simplistic, myopic and apart from adding little substance to the debate, they divert
precious time and resources away from efforts that really count toward alleviating the
suffering caused by the devastating health crisis. In reality,the impact of patents on
public health is moot for many in the developing countries where inadequate healthcare
and health infrastructure poses a much more immediate and significant problem. Put
simply, patents do not even come into consideration if one cannot get a diagnosis by
virtue of the fact that they do not have access to a doctor, or more accurately, a properly
trained and equipped doctor.
This article examines the many factors that have created and continue to perpetuate
the ongoing health crisis in developing countries. In so doing, the article will reveal that
the focus on patent regulation is largely misguided and that the targeting of
pharmaceutical companies and TRIPS has lead to an unfortunate divergence from the
actual critical issues that affect the delivery of much- needed care and medicines to the
developing world. The article then argues that the critical issues lie not in constructing
appropriate TRIPS provisions, but more so in providing financial resources to build,
maintain and stabilize proper healthcare systems in those developing countries afflicted
with public health crises. Just as importantly, the article also illustrates the need for
developing countries to prioritize public health while at the same time minimize the
effects of poor economic planning and policies as well as societal problems such as
corruption and civil strife. This article does not fully absolve pharmaceutical companies
from blame nor does it claim that TRIPS strikes the appropriate balance between creators

PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE , A CCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 244-58 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds.,
2002).
10
For a definition of access to essential medicines see WHO, THE W ORLD M EDICINES SITUATION 61-74
(1999). This definition was essentially incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):
“The world's time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensionsincome poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion-while promoting gender equality,
education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights-the rights of each person on
the planet to health, education, shelter, and security.” UN Millennium Project website,
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2007). Goal 6 seeks to combat
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases, and targets 2015 for halting and beginning to reverse the incidence
and spread of these and other diseases. Id.
11
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter Uruguay Round] (establishing the WTO in the last round of GATT and also creating treaties
covering various trade topics); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement] (establishing a multilateral agreement creating minimum protection standards for
various forms of intellectual property among Memb er States).
12
See, e.g., PASCALE BOULET ET AL ., MSF, DRUG PATENTS UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT : SHARING PRACTICAL
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS (2004), available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/Patent%20report%20.pdf.
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and users in every situation, but much has already been written on these two issues. 13
Instead, this article focuses on and examines possible solutions or initiatives that may be
adopted to alleviate the current public health problem and assesses their practicability in
light of the particular situations and circumstances affecting the developing world.
Part II briefly reviews the TRIPS Agreement and analyses efforts to rebalance the
Agreement in favor of developing countries in the form of the Doha Declaration on
Public Health and its derivative agreements. Part III shows that, although the regime of
patent protection has been blamed for creating or at least worsening the public health
crises inflicting much of the developing world, the situations is far more complex and, in
reality, patents and TRIPS have played a very small role in the crisis. Part IV reviews
several contributing factors into the crisis and offers several suggestions which, if fully
implemented, will go a long way in alleviating the public health crises and improving the
lives of millions in the developing world. Part V concludes that the health crisis raging
through much of the developing world can be alleviated, but only through a global
commitment from the international community whereby developed countries increase the
amount as well as the coordination of funding and aid activities and developing countries
prioritize public health, improve infrastructure and work towards creating an environment
conducive to growth and sustainability, and study and implement alternatives to current
research and development schemes that provide more incentive to research certain
diseases.
II. TRIPS AND THE DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH

¶6

The TRIPS Agreement is comprehensive in its coverage and includes copyright and
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, product and
process patents, layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, and protection of
undisclosed information. 14 Like other covered agreements of the WTO, TRIPS is based
on the most-favored-nation and national treatment principles, but unlike any of the other
WTO agreements, TRIPS also establishes minimum levels of protection that each
Member must provide and grant to other Members. 15 It is imperative to understand that
such a regulatory, harmonized approach to this issue is unlike the approach taken in any
of the other WTO Agreements.

13

See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role of FTAs, GRAIN, Nov.
2003, http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=28 (last visited July 16, 2006); Laurence R. Helfer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT ’L L. 1 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to
Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference (Fla. St. Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 36 and QUNO Occasional Paper No. 7, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285934; Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent
Protection, 7 J. INT ’L ECON. L. 459 (2004); Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global
Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing
Countries, 26 NW . J. INT ’L L. & BUS. 1 (2005).
14
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at Part II.
15
Id.; see generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Es tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994).
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The controversial inclusion of intellectual property into the multilateral trading
system has already been well-traversed in existing literature and will not be repeated
here. 16 It must be noted, however, that even with the lengthy implementation periods and
‘flexibilities’ built into TRIPS, several WTO Members and interested observers have
long recognized that TRIPS results in overall trade gains for developed nations, 17 while at
the same time failing to reach an appropriate balance with respect to patent protection and
access to life-saving medicines in developing and least-developed countries. 18
Unfortunately, reaching agreement on improve ments to the system has prove n to be a
much harder proposition and in this regard, the work of several NGOs should be given
due credit for their persistent efforts and pressure in forcing the issue onto the agenda and
keeping it in the spotlight of multilateral discussions. 19 Those organizations were
undoubtedly partially responsible for getting public health issues on the agenda at the
Third Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in 1999. 20 Regrettably, the Seattle
Ministerial ended without success and the resolution of several key health issues did not
solidify until the Fourth Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar in 2001, launched
the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Doha Round). 21
At Doha, Members adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (Doha
Declaration or the Declaration) which restated and affirmed the right of Member States to
take measures to protect public health, clarified certain textual ambiguities contained in
TRIPS and attempted to provide assistance to developing countries and LDCs in
resolving the public health crises that are devastating many parts of the developing
world. 22 The Declaration is significant for a number of reasons. First, it “represented the
first time international health and development was discussed at every level of WTO
governance.”23 Second, it was “the first significant victory for developing countries in
16

See, e.g., Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing
World, 8 M ARQ. INTELL. PROP . L. REV. 211, 215-16 (2004); Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPs:
The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT 'L ECON. L. 1069, 1072-77
(1996); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003-04); Adronico O. Adede, Origins and History of the
TRIPS Negotiations, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE : DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY 23, 23-35 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
17
See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES.
J. OF INT ’L L. 471 (2000).
18
See, e.g., UK COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
POLICY (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf
[hereinafter UK CIPR]; T RADING IN KNOWLEDGE : DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
19
For a listing of NGO position papers filed with the WTO before the Doha Round see WTO, NonGovernmental Organizations: Working Papers, http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp21_e.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
20
For a worthy discussion on the negotiating history of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration see SUSAN K.
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW , THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121, 12162 (2003).
21
Elizabeth Olson, Squabbles at the Start for World Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at W1.
22
See World Trade Organization (WTO), Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. For detailed
information and analysis regarding the lead up to the Implementation Agreement see Mercurio, supra note
16. See also KATHARINA GAMHARTER, A CCESS TO A FFORDABLE M EDICINES: DEVELOPING RESPONSES
UNDER THE TRIPS A GREEMENT AND EC LAW 159-246 (2004).
23
Mercurio, supra note 16, at 212.
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the short history of TRIPS.”24 Finally, the Declaration recognized that public health
issues can take precedence over the rights of private intellectual property holders. 25 India
called the Declaration “the most important single achievement of the Doha Round,”
while the Philippines hailed the Declaration as being “the crowning glory of the WTO’s
contribution to global welfare and humanitarian concerns, especially for those who were
gravely afflicted by the scourge of epidemics and other public health problems.”26
¶9
Broadly speaking, the Declaration sought to “clarify” the TRIPS Agreement while
giving emphasis to the “flexibilities” already written into the agreement, including the
right of Members to invoke those provisions when needed. 27 Paragraphs 1 through 5
contain the Declaration’s most significant conclusions. Paragraphs 1 through 3 outline
the concerns of both developing and developed countries by providing context for the
issue of intellectual property protection for medicines while recognizing the need to
balance private property and public welfare interests. 28 More specifically, paragraph 1
“recognizes the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics,”29 while paragraphs 2 and 3 express the need for TRIPS to
be part of the wider national and international action to address the problems and
recognize that the link between intellectual property protection for the creation of new
medicines as well as the concerns about the effect of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on
prices. 30
¶10
Paragraph 4 affirms the principle that protecting public health and promoting access
to medicines is a valid basis for Members to enact exceptions to patent protection in their
domestic legislation. 31 Specifically, paragraph 4 states that TRIPS “does not and should
not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health” and “affirms that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”32 Thus, paragraph 4 reinforces the plain meaning of Article 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which permits Members to “adopt measures necessary to protect
public health…”33
¶11
Paragraph 5 provides Members with flexibilities in implementing TRIPS and
reaffirms the right of WTO Members to use the provisions in TRIPS for the purposes of
Paragraph 4. 34 The paragraph sets out the “provisions,” which may be used for this
purpose:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of
24

Id.
Id. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at para. 4.
26
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting held in the
Centre William Rappard on Nov. 25-27, 29, and Dec. 20, 2002, IP/C/M/38 (Feb. 5, 2003) at 38, 45.
27
See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 22.
28
See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at paras. 1-3.
29
Id. at para. 1.
30
Id. at paras. 2 and 3.
31
Id. at para. 4.
32
Id.
33
Id.; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at Article 8.
34
Id. at para. 5.
25
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the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.
(b) Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.
(c) Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant
to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each me mber
free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge,
subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4. 35
¶12

Paragraph 6 “recognizes that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” but the paragraph left the issue
unresolved, instead instructing the Council for TRIPS to find an “expeditious solution” to
the problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002. 36
¶13
The failure to resolve the availability of compulsory licensing exceptions to patent
protection for countries suffering a public health crisis with insufficient or no
manufacturing capabilities tempered the success of the Declaration. 37 As TRIPS Article
31(f) conditions the issuance of compulsory licenses on being “predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use,” a Member State
could only override valid patent laws so long as it obtained the generic drugs from
domestic producers. 38 Whether intentionally or accidentally, Article 31(f) prevents a
country from benefiting from the compulsory licensing provision if it does not have
sufficient manufacturing capabilities because, in practice, the provision limits the
licensee’s ability to export medicines to a country with public health needs, thereby
preventing countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities from taking
advantage of the provision. 39 Additio nally, as most countries needing to make use of the
patent exceptions are economically troubled nations with insufficient or no
manufacturing capabilities, Article 31 of TRIPS failed in its purpose of assisting those
nations it was designed to benefit. 40
¶14
After several delays and weeks of constant negotiation in the days leading to the
Fifth Ministerial Conference (Cancun Ministerial), a resolution to the issue was finally
reached on August 30, 2003. 41 In fact, when endless debate over technical points looked
35

Id.
Id. at para. 6.
37
See generally id.
38
See TRIPS, supra note 11, at art. 31(f).
39
Id.
40
Mercurio, supra note 16, at 213.
41
On November 25, 2002, the Chairperson of the TRIPS Council informed the Members that he was
36
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as if it would hamper an agreement being formed, a group of African countries reminded
Ministers that while potential solutions had been discussed in the interim years, the
situation of medicinal access in poor countries had worsened. 42 During this time, those
countries continued to lose the battle against such public health epidemics as
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. 43 In a joint statement, the group poignantly stated
that “8,480 people had died unnecessarily in Africa from HIV/AIDS and other diseases
since the talks stalled over an accompanying document to the Agreement only two days
earlier [Aug. 28, 2003].”44 The statement had the desired effect: the Ministers put their
differences aside and reached agreement on a “temporary waiver” in the form of The
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (Implementation Agreement) and accompanying Chairperson’s Statement. 45 At
the time, Canadian Ambassador Sergio Marchi commented: “[The African countries]
showed that the poorest among us do make a difference in this organization... They
helped the WTO find its heart and soul.”46
¶15
The Implementation Agreement resolved the Article 31(f) situation by creating an
exception to Article 31(f) of TRIPS that allows nations with insufficient or no
manufacturing capabilities to override intellectual property protection and import generic
copies of patented drugs to combat public health crises. 47 However, in order to be TRIPS
compliant, the importing Member must abide by several procedural steps, namely that the
importing Member:
(1) must notify the TRIPS Council of the “names and expected quantities
of the products needed”;

holding consultations on implementing the Paragraph 6 mandate of the Doha Declaration. On November
29, the Chairperson reported that intensive consultations had led to significant progress and that a draft
legal instrument was almost finalized. The draft was tabled on December 16, but was not adopted when the
U.S. would not agree to the paragraph concerning the scope of diseases covered. See Minutes of TRIPS
Council Meeting, supra note 26, at 33-34; Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Note from the Chairperson, JOB(02)/217 (2002).
42
Naomi Koppel, WTO Lets Poor Nations Import Cheap Drugs, A SSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30, 2003,
available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2003/AP030847.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement]. The agreement
was only finalized when the Memb ers agreed to attach a statement to the text setting out the conditions
under which the measure detailed in the Implementation Agreement can be used. Among other things, the
Statement: (i) “recognizes that the [compulsory licensing] system ... should be used in good faith to protect
public health and [not as] an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives”; (ii)
“recognizes that the purpose of the [Implementation Agreement] would be defeated if [drugs were] diverted
from the [intended] markets” and calls on Members to take “all reasonable measures” to “prevent such
diversion”; and (iii) reiterates the importance of Members to seek expeditious and amicable resolutions to
issues arising from the Implementation Agreement. See The General Council Chairperson's Statement,
WTO NEWS, Aug. 30, 2003, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm
[hereinafter Chairperson's Statement]. The Implementation Agreement was transformed into a permanent
amendment of the TRIPS on December 6, 2005. This represented the first time a WTO Agreement had
been amended.
46
Koppel, supra note 42.
47
See Implementation Agreement, supra note 45.
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(2) must confirm that it is either a LDC or “establish[] that it has
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
for the products in question”; and
(3) confirm that, if the “product is patented in its territory, [that] it has
granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in accordance with
[TRIPS] Article 31.”48
¶16

The Implementation Agreement also outlines several procedural conditions an
exporting Member must fulfill when issuing a compulsory license:
2. The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a
compulsory licence to the extent necessary for the purposes of production
of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible importing
Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below in this paragraph:
a) the eligible importing Member(s) has made a notification to the Council
for TRIPS, that:
(i) specifies the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed;
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a
least developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient or
no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the
product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the Annex to this
Decision; and
(iii) confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its
territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence in
accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of
this Decision;
(b) the compulsory licence issued by the exporting Member under this
Decision shall contain the following conditions:
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs
to the Council for TRIPS;
(ii) products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as being
produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific
labelling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through
48

Id. at para. 2(a).
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special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a
significant impact on price; and
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website the
following information:
- the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in indent
(i) above; and
- the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii)
above;
(c) the exporting Member shall notify the Council for TRIPS of the grant
of the licence, includ ing the conditions attached to it. The information
provided shall include the name and address of the licensee, the product(s)
for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has
been granted, the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be
supplied and the duration of the licence. The notification shall also
indicate the address of the website referred to in subparagraph (b)(iii)
above. 49
¶17

While the Implementation Agreement goes some way in addressing the legal hole
that existed, it is not a miracle solution and to hold it out as such would be extremely
misleading. 50 To some, the Implementation Agreement fails to satisfactorily resolve
several issues, including: (i) the scope of diseases and product coverage; (ii) countries
that would be eligible to use the system; (iii) ensuring adequate remuneration; and (iv)
safeguarding the system against diversion of drugs into other markets. 51 Health and
policy advocates, meanwhile, have also criticized the Implementation Agreement, in
particular the prerequisite that a drug supplied under compulsory licence must normally
be clearly identifiable as a generic version. 52 These critics often argue that even though
the requirement may be met through a variety of features – such as labelling, marking,
49

Implementation Agreement, supra note 45, at para. 2.
See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the
Protection of Public Health, 99 A M. J. OF INT ’L L. 317, 325 (2005); Jacques H. J. Bourgeois & Thaddeus J.
Burns, Implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on Trade and Public Health: The Waiver
Solution, 5 J. OF W ORLD INTELL. PROP . 835, 838 (2002).
51
See generally Mercurio, supra note 16.
52
For criticism, see MSF, MSF Comments on the Draft Chairman's Statement of 21 August 2003 (Aug.
26, 2003), http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=26820031712133&contenttype=PARA& [hereinafter MSF
Comments]; MSF, Neither Expeditious, Nor a Solution:
The WTO August 30th Decision is Unworkable, http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=10820061618476&contenttype=PARA& (last visited Nov. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter MSF, Neither Expeditious]. MSF also criticizes the requirement of prior negotiation before
issuing a compulsory licence (which can be waived for a “national emergency” or for public noncommercial use), the anti-diversion measures built into the waiver, notification of intention to use the
Implementation Agreement, and–somewhat bizarrely–even the requirement that the licensee must post on a
website the quantities being supplied by compulsory licence and the distinguishing features of the supplied
drugs. Id.
50
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special packaging, or by the specific colouring of shaping of the drug – ensuring that such
distinguishing characteristics are present could raise procedural and administrative costs
in the export of generic versions. 53 This could possibly render the process less costeffective and efficient than initially presumed and lengthen the time it takes to get the
generic drugs to countries where they are needed. 54 Furthermore, many in the
international community believe that meeting other requirements of the Implementation
Agreement will also make the waiver hard to exploit. 55
¶18
In addition, and importantly as will be discussed below, both developing and
developed countries have been slow to secure the necessary domestic implementing
legislation operationalizing the Implementation Agreement. For instance, countries that
may wish to take advantage of the provision in the future – that is, those which could
possibly have insufficient or no manufacturing capability to meet a public health need –
have by and large not passed domestic legislation which would override patent laws and
allow them to import necessary medicines under a compulsory licence. In addition,
countries which have pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities have been slow to pass
legislation allowing their respective industry to supply nations attempting to make use of
the provision with the requested drugs under compulsory licence. 56 For some time, only
Canada and Norway had passed the necessary implementing legislation. 57 At the time of
this writing, China, the European Communities, India, Korea, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland have also enacted comprehensive legislation implementing the 30 August
decision. 58 Even more worrisome is the fact that some developed nations do not appear
interested in promoting and passing such legislation. 59
53

See, e.g., MSF Comments, supra note 52; MSF, Neither Expeditious, supra note 52 ; Cecilia Oh, The
New “Deal” On Trips and Drugs: What Does it Mean for Access to Medicines?, in TWN BRIEFINGS FOR
CANCUN 4, 4 (2003), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/cancun4.doc; contra CARLOS CORREA,
DEPARTMENT OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS AND M EDICINES POLICY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL
COUNCIL DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS A GREEMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 22 (2004), www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WTO_DOHA_DecisionPara6final.pdf. It must
also be noted that the Implementation Agreement waives the obligation for packaging, colouring or shaping
when it is either not feasible or significantly impacts upon the price. Implementation Agreement, supra note
45, at para. 2(b)(ii).
54
See, e.g., Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines
Problem?, 7 J. INT ’L ECON. L. 73, 96-97 (2004).
55
See, e.g., Oh, supra note 53; Campaign For Access To Essential Medicines, Joint NGO Statement on
TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deal on Medicines: a “Gift” Bound in Red Tape, http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=1292003916443&contenttype=PARA& (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
For a model arrangement, see Condon & Sinha, supra note 13.
56
For detail on the legal and administrative burdens and obstacles to legislating, see DFID HEALTH
SYSTEMS RESOURCE CENTRE , A CCESS TO M EDICINES IN UNDER-SERVED M ARKETS: W HAT A RE THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND DRUG REGISTRATION
POLICY? 6 (2004), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/dfidsynthesispaper.pdf [hereinafter
DFID].
57
Id.
58
For links to the implementing legislation and supporting documents, see Legislation to Allow for the
Export of Pharmaceuticals Produced Under Compulsory License,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-export-legislation.html (last visited July 16, 2006). The domestic
legislation enacted in most, if not all, countries has also been criticized. See, e.g., Neither Expeditious,
surpa note 52, at 2; Matthew Rimmer, The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act: Patent Law and
Humanitarian Aid, 15(7) EXP . OPIN . THER. PATENTS 889 (2005).
59
See Rimmer, supra note 58, at 905; TRIPS Council Remains Divided on Public Health Amendment,
9(36) BRIDGES W KLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. (2005), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-
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¶19

To date, there have not been any notifications to the TRIPS Council regarding the
issuance of a compulsory licence. This is not surprising, as prior to 2005, developing
country members such as India and Brazil could produce and supply generic versions of
patented drugs without the need for the issuance of a compulsory license. 60 TRIPS,
however, is playing an increasingly bigger role and becoming more important in the
expansion of access to medicines and public health in the developing world following the
expiration of certain transitory flexibilities and implementation periods in January 2005. 61
TRIPS now has the potential to become a barrier to access to affordable new medicines
and vaccines as the rules on compulsory licensing become operational for a number of
developing country Members who are now subject to totality of the TRIPS Agreement. 62
The practical result of this is that TRIPS now affects generic producers’ ability to provide
existing medicines for developing countries without sufficient manufacturing
capabilities. 63 Thus, developed nations passing the necessary legislation operationalizing
the Implementation Agreement takes on even more importance.
¶20
Perhaps more worrisome with regards to the development of essential medicines in
the developing world is the addition of intellectual property provisions in bilateral and
regional free trade agreements (FTAs) requiring signatories to advance protection beyond

26/story3.htm; see also MSF, THE JEAN CHRÉTIEN , PLEDGE TO A FRICA A CT OR CANADA’S ATTEMPT TO
PROVIDE MEDICINES FOR THE POOR (2002), available at
http://www.msf.ca/tour2006/press/images/BRIEF_jcpa.pdf .
60
Several countries, including India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and
Zambia, have all in the past is sued compulsory licenses for the importation of generic drugs or authorized
local production of generic drugs for patented AIDS drugs. MSF, W ILL THE LIFELINE OF A FFORDABLE
M EDICINES FOR POOR COUNTRIES BE CUT ? CONSEQUENCES OF M EDICINES PATENTING IN INDIA (2005),
http://www.msf.fr/documents/base/2005-02-01-msf.pdf [hereinafter MSF 2005].
61
These transitional periods are of the utmost importance in terms of access to medicines in the
developing world, as the delayed implementation of TRIPS allows several countries that possess the ability
to cheaply produce copies of patented drugs and sell them for much lower prices than the patent holder.
This practice became more difficult as of January 1, 2005, when the leading generic manufacturing nations
(including India) became subject to TRIPS. As a result, compulsory licensing may be less effective in the
absence of a generic industry. UK CIPR, supra note 18 (“[After January 1, 2005,] without special
arrangements, the possibility of compulsory licensing being a vehicle for price reductions will be more
limited than at present, even in the few technologically advanced developing countries. For most countries,
the only feasible supplier may be the patentee (or his licensee).”).
62
Many believe the introduction of generic competition reduces the price of drugs. For instance, the
price of one AIDS treatment reportedly dropped by 82% in Brazil after the government began producing
generics. MSF 2004, supra note 1, at 2 (“The single most important factor in forcing down the prices of
medicines is generic competition. The lowest price of an AIDS drug combination plummeted from more
than US $10,000 per patient per year to less than US $200 between 2000 and 2004.”). For a table showing
the prices of drugs pre- and post- generic competition, see id. at 3. It has been estimated that the post-2005
cost of new drugs will rise by 200%. F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-Trips Options for Access to
Patented Medicines in Developing Countries 7-8 (Comm’n on Macroeconomics and Heath, Working
Paper No. WG4:1, 2001). See also Balasubramniam, supra note 8, at 137-38; DFID, supra note 56, 12-13;
contra, Carol C. Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS Treatment, HUDSON INST . 8-9 (2nd ed. 2005)
(finding the majority of patented drug prices to be within the range of lower than generic/copy drug prices
for both single dose and combination AIDS drugs) [hereinafter Adelman, et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS
Treatment].
63
That being said, patents are crucial to the development of drugs: “Without patents, existing anti-AIDS
drugs would not have been produced. Without patents, new and better drugs that are needed to overcome
the increasing resistance of the AIDS virus would not be developed.” W ORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANISATION, STRIKING A BALANCE : THE PATENT SYSTEM AND A CCESS TO DRUGS AND HEALTH CARE ,
WIPO Publication No. 491(E), available at
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/491/wipo_pub_491.pdf [hereinafter WIPO No. 491(E)].
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the minimum standards required by TRIPS (the so-called TRIPS-Plus provisions). 64 Not
only is the addition of the so-called “TRIPS-Plus” part of a larger strategy to achieve
outcomes which are not feasible multilaterally, but it is also apparent that such provisions
are in response to the powerful and persistent lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical
industry. 65 These provisions have the potential to hinder access to essential medicines by
limiting access to the flexibilities that currently exist in TRIPS to protect public health.
Such TRIPS-consistent flexibilities that are now forming part of many FTA provisions
limiting the flexibilities granted in TRIPS and potentially curtailing possible government
responses to public health crises include, inter alia, restricting the conditions for the
issuance of compulsory licensing, extending the period of data exclusivity and other
protections, extending the patent term and ‘new use’ patents (so called ‘evergreening’),
preventing parallel importation, and linking the ‘market approval’ of a drug to patent
status (requiring drug and health regulatory agencies to intersect with national patent
offices and undertake some form of oversight duties). 66 These provisions are, however,
WTO-consistent as the standards elucidated in TRIPS are simply minimum standards,
and Members are allowed to grant greater protection to intellectual property rights if they
so desire. 67
¶21
Thus, despite the Doha Round’s merits in bringing the issue of the international
health to the fore, serious gaps must still be addressed in the regulation of intellectual
property at the global level. 68 The impact of the Implementation Agreement may be
debated, 69 but even if intellectual property provisions contained in TRIPS were
64

For more on the development of TRIPS-Plus provisions, see Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions
in RTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE A GREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Lorand Bartels
& Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
65
See REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY FUNCTIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS FOR TRADE POLICY M ATTERS (IFAC-3), THE US-CENTRAL A MERICAN FREE TRADE A GREEMENT :
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS (2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/asset_upload_file571_5
945.pdf.
66
See, e.g., Mercurio, supra note 64; Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role
of FTAs, GRAIN, Nov. 2003, http://www.grain.org/rights_files/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf.
67
Article 4 of the TRIPS agreement states that a Member who grants “any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity” to the nationals of any other country (whether that country be a Member of the WTO/TRIPS
or not) must accord the same treatment to the nationals of other Members of TRIPS. The clause operates in
a relatively unqualified way because, unlike art. XXIV of the GATT, which may serve to exempt FTAs
from the operation of MFN, TRIPS does not contain a similar provision; thus, the principle of MFN applies
to FTAs. Therefore, if enough FTAs are negotiated containing TRIPS-plus provisions, these provisions will
essentially become the new minimum standard from which any future WTO trade round will proceed. For a
detailed analysis, see Drahos, supra note 66. See also FREDERICK A BBOTT, THE DOHA DECLARATION ON
THE TRIPS A GREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE CONTRADICTORY TREND IN BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE A GREEMENTS (2004), http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occassional/TRIPSPublic -Health-FTAs.pdf.
68
It is important to note that the issue of TRIPS and public health is now firmly on the international
agenda, with the topic regularly discussed and debated at intra- and inter-institutional meetings. For more
on the importance of this development see Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective
Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism 8 J. of
Int’l Econ. L. 77 (2005).
69
For instance, on the day of the Implementation Agreement (August 30, 2003) the WTO headlined a
press release “Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports,” Oxfam titled their press
release “Flawed WTO Drugs Deal Will do Little to Secure Future Access to Medicines in Developing
Countries,” and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association stated in their press
release, “Now it is time to focus on the real access barriers.” See Press Release, WTO, Decision Removes
Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
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completely pro-developing country, or if the (mostly western) NGOs purporting to
represent the interests of the developing world received everything that they demanded of
the WTO, would the continuing health crises in the developing world be alleviated?
Would the health crises even be minimized? The pharmaceutical industry and the patent
provisions in TRIPS have been subjected to much criticism over the last decade and
charges that they are to blame for the lack of access to medicine in developing countries
are not uncommon. However, there is strong evidence which shows that patent
protection of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS alone are not impeding access to essential
medicines in developing countries. In fact, this article argues that IPRs have not even
been a significant factor when the situation is objectively assessed and considered in its
entirety.
III. CRITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN SOLVING THE ACCESS TO MEDICINE PROBLEM
¶22

Even under the best circumstances, merely alleviating the public health crisis in
many parts of the developing world to a noticeable degree will be difficult to achieve.
The situation requires international cooperation on a massive scale to not only ensure that
the developing world has access to essential medicines but to also create incentives to
stimulate (or directly fund) research and development into new medicines and vaccines to
treat the diseases primarily affecting the developing world.
¶23
It is unfortunate that several high profile NGOs have concentrated their effort in
blaming the pharmaceutical industry and the patent regime for worsening the crises. 70
While these groups have spent significant monetary resources and intellectual effort
directing much of the debate over the access to essential medicines in the developing
world on the issue of patent protection of pharmaceuticals to the actions of the
pharmaceutical industry and the patent regime, the constant accusations and resulting
publicity ha ve not helped the situation and, to the contrary, have been highly divisive,
arguably lengthening the time between the Doha Ministerial and the implementation of
the Implementation Agreement and obscuring longstanding impediments to improving
the lives and health of millions. In order to control the problem and even hope to
alleviate suffering, all interested parties must realize that patent protection is only one of
many factors that play a role in the health of the developing world and other critical
factors, such as poor living conditions, the lack of medical facilities and proper

www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm; Press Release, Oxfam, Flawed WTO Drugs Deal
Will do Little to Secure Future Access to Medicines in Developing Countries (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2003/pr030830_wto_final.htm; Press Release, European Federation
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association, EFPIA Statement on Compulsory License for Export
(“Paragraph 6” of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS & Public Health) (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
www.efpia.org/3_press/20030830.htm.
70
See, e.g., MSF, Publications on Patents, http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=185&status=182 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006); MSF,
WTO TRIPS Agreement, http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=185&status=182 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); MSF,
Pricing Policy, http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/morepublications.asp?catid=1&subcatid=187&status=182 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007); OXFAM,
DARE TO LEAD: PUBLIC HEALTH AND COMPANY WEALTH (2001),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/health/downloads/daretolead.pdf.

14

Vol. 5:1]

Bryan Mercurio

infrastructure, malnutrition, and the lack of means for distributing and administrating
medicine, must be addressed in order to alleviate the public health crises. 71
¶24
Somewhere in the past decade, important facts such as the appallingly low levels of
medical infrastructure in developing nations, inadequate levels of foreign assistance and
seeming lack of political will in some developing countries to alleviate the suffering were
marginalized as the debate focused on TRIPS. 72 Thus, even though infrastructure, aid
from developed countries and political will in developing countries is not even remotely
adequate to ease the worsening health situation in the developing world, the international
debate diverted key monetary resources, intellectual efforts and negotiating capacity on a
secondary issue. One noted expert concludes: “AIDS activists have done a huge
disservice to the problem of providing relief to people in the developing world by
directing a disproportionate focus on the patent issue.”73
¶25
Crises such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and others gripping much of the developing
world are a very real and escalating problem in many developing nations. But the fact is
that if patent regulation did not exist, much of the developing world would still lack
access to essential medicines. Importantly, 95% of the pharmaceutical products on the
WHO Essential Drug List (such as medicines to treat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) are
off-patent and, due to flexibilities contained in TRIPS and extended by Paragraph 7 of the
Declaration and waivers granted in 2002 by the Council for TRIPS, the grace period for
LDCs delaying implementation of Sections 5 (patents) and 7 (confidential information) in
relation to pharmaceutical products and the marketing rights thereof have been extended
until 2016; meaning LDCs do not currently have to provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. 74
¶26
To illustrate, as of 2003, of the fifteen antiretroviral (ARV) drugs used for treating
AIDS, patent coverage is below 20%, with 172 patents out of the 759 that could
theoretically apply. 75 Moreover, of the 52 African nations, only South Africa has patent
71

It is conceded, however, that combination/cocktail drugs have proven the most effective means of
controlling AIDS and, given that the pharmaceutical companies are normally only able to combine their
own drugs (although this is beginning to change as pharmaceutical companies see the benefit of forming
joint ventures with rival companies), patent protection may be preventing another potential treatment from
coming onto the market. Fortunately, generic Indian manufacturers who were not stifled by IPRs have
mixed drugs with some success and the innovative pharmaceutical industry is showing signs of
cooperation.
72
See, e.g., G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001). For instance, it has been
estimated that researching and developing a new malaria treatment requires $300-$500 million dollars more
per year than it currently receives.
73
Bruce A. Lehman, Globalization's Impact on International Trade and Intellectual Property Law:
Intellectual Property Rights as a Trade, Health and Economic Development Issue, 17 ST . JOHN 'S J. 417,
419-20 (2003).
74
See Doha Declaration, supra note 22, at para 7; see also Press Release, WTO, Extension of the
Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Product, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of
27 June 2002 (June 28, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm [hereinafter
WTO, Extension of Transition Period]; General Council, Least-Developed Country Members--Obligations
under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WT/L/478 (July 12,
2002). On June 27, 2002, the Council for TRIPS extended the transition period during which LDCs do not
have to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals. WTO, Extension of Transition Period. The Council
also approved a waiver that exempts LDCs having to provide exclusive marketing rights for any new drugs
in the period when they do not provide patent protection. Id.
75
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (Ph RMA), Health Care in the Developing
World: Intellectual Property and Access to AIDS Drugs,
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protection for more than half of its AIDS drugs, with 15 patents out of a possible 16.
Importantly, 25% of the countries provide no patents and the rest have an average of 4
patented drugs, with no patents on more than a dozen different triple-therapy cocktails
used to combat HIV/AIDS. 76 Thus, while the majority of African countries do not patent
most ARV drugs used to treat AIDS and the majority of countries of sub-Saharan Africa
do not have any patent protection for any of the drugs, the AIDS epidemic continues to
infect and kill millions of people per year on the continent.
¶27
Interestingly, several members of the medical community also contest the view that
patent protection has exacerbated the HIV/AIDS crisis or significantly impeded access to
essential medicines. For instance, a widely cited study conducted in 2001 by Amir
Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White and published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association states:
[It appears that] patents and patent law are not a major barrier to treatment
access in and of themselves. 77
¶28

Yet the developing world continues to suffer without adequate supply of the needed
medicines, begging the question what are the primary causes of, or more appropriately,
what are the barriers to resolving, the continuing crises and lack of access to life-saving
medicines in the developing world. This article suggests that there are two main
solutions for the ongoing public health crises in the developing world:
(1) access to existing medicines must increase; and
(2) incentives to promote the development of new medicines and vaccines must
increase.
¶29
Part IV elaborates upon these two issues by addressing several barriers currently
present and offering indicatives and suggestions in an attempt to alleviate the suffering
and resolve the public health crises.
IV. POLICY BASED SOLUTIONS/ INITIATIVES AND THEIR VIABILITY
¶30

The public health crisis in the developing world is a global problem and any
potential solution cannot be borne by one entity. Instead, the problem requires a
commitment from all members of the international community to provide funding and
strategic planning to improve the currently insufficient medical infrastructure of many
developing world countries. The burden cannot be placed solely on governments of
developing or developed countries, on pharmaceutical companies or on international
organisations, such as the WHO. Rather, those entities as well as research groups, the
media and even the citizenry of developed nations all must participate as vital actors.
This section examines how these entities can all play a pivotal role in easing the suffering
http://world.phrma.org/ip.access.aids.drugs.html.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Ph RMA 2003].
76
Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE (IIPI), PATENT PROTECTION AND
A CCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 52 (2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/iipi_hiv.pdf (finding the substantial majority of
pharmaceuticals to combat HIV/AIDS have never been patented in most African countries).
77
Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS
Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. A M. M ED. A SS’N 1881, 1881-92 (2001). The authors focused on capacity
relating problems and concluded that “patents generally do not appear to be a substantial barrier to
antiretroviral treatment access in Africa today.” Id. at 1891.
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in the developing world. At the outset, it must be noted that as situations differ for every
region and for every disease it is not possible to design one encompassing solution to the
problem. Therefore, the following merely offers general indicatives and suggestions
which should be further studied and employed as the situation dictates.
A. Global commitment from developed countries
¶31

The suffering in the developing world will not be alleviated without a global
commitment to finance health improvements. As developing countries historically do not
have the necessary resources and/or will to finance such an initiative, advanced
industrialized countries must take on more responsibility and lead the way in funding the
restructuring of the current inadequate medical infrastructure that exists in so many
developing countries. One funding initiative governments could take is to raise general
revenues through the wide range of available tax instruments or shift financing from
other domestic areas to fund this global initiative. 78 Practically speaking, however,
neither option is particularly appealing as governments are hesitant to raise taxes or shift
funds from certain domestic areas to any international effort due to potential opposition
by their citizens or embarrassment by opposing political parties.
¶32
In this regard, the media and international organisations – such as the WHO – may
be able to play a significant role in raising awareness of the extent to which widespread
epidemics ravage much of the developing world. Unfortunately, for many in the
developed world, epidemics such as malaria and tuberculosis seem so far removed from
their highly industrialized societies, where such diseases do not exist or are controlled to
acceptable levels, that often the awareness generated does not arouse sufficient empathy
to the cause. This apathy, and corresponding shortage of international funding, is a major
contributing factor to the ongoing public health crises in the developing world. This fact
led Attaran and Gillespie-White to conclude that “the extreme dearth of international aid
finance, rather than patents, is most to blame for the lack of antiretroviral treatment in
Africa.”79
¶33
On the other hand, there is clear evidence that both governments and citizens of the
industrialized world can be generously responsive to public health crises. For instance,
one need only look back at the international response to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami
disaster, where worldwide broadcasting of the sudden devastation resulted in billions of
dollars of aid donations within a matter of weeks to fund the provision of necessary
medicines, food, clean water and other relief efforts. 80 The large-scale international
outpouring of aid was no doubt largely a result of people visualising the suffering of
78
For instance, the often posed, so-called Tobin Tax (a tax on cross border currency trades across
borders) could be implemented nationally by industrialized countries (but enforced multi-nationally) to
raise an estimated $100-$300 billion per year. However, in addition to a lack of support within the citizenry
of most nations, leading developed countries also oppose the Tobin Tax as it would reduce the currency
exchange market, the consequences of which are unknown.
79
Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 77, at 1891.
80
See, for example, the responses of the British Red Cross, Boxing Day Tsunami, 2004: Background
Information, http://www.redcross.org.uk/standard.asp?id=46361 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007), USAID, USAID
Rebuilds Lives After the Tsunami, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami/ (last visited
Jan. 2, 2007), Asia Relief, Indonesia Floods, http://asiarelief.win.aplus.net/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) and
MSF/DWB, MSF Operations & Financial Overview: One Year After The Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster,
http://www.doctorswithoutborders-usa.org/news/sasia_tsunami/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
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millions of displaced people and the death of hundreds of thousands of people in the days
following the disaster. 81 Perhaps if there was extensive coverage of public health issues
in the media informing of the urgency to control widespread epidemics such as
HIV/AIDS and malaria, a similar outpouring of aid relief may be possible. At the very
least, the campaign may lead to a positive and willing response by citizens of developed
countries to support government actions to raise taxes or redistribute domestic funding
for this international initiative. 82
¶34
Developed countries do currently contribute to the fight against diseases in a
number of ways, including partially financing medical programmes such as the Global
Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 83 While such initiatives are certainly a step
in the right direction, developed countries have been criticized for their lack of
commitment to the effort. 84 In this regard, not only mus t the international community
commit to increased financing and aid efforts, but perhaps more importantly, it needs to
actually execute and fulfill its existing aid promises and commitments. Increased levels
of properly targeted, long-term aid would go a long way towards alleviating the public
health crises while at the same time assisting countries in working to end economic
dependency. 85 In fact, the situation would improve if countries merely fulfill their
commitment to providing an amount equal to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on
official development assistance (ODA). 86 Increased aid, however, will not materialize
without effective monitoring coupled with the minimisation of waste and a reduction in
corruption; in other words, the international community will only increase their financial
obligations and commitment to the developing world when they are confident the aid will
be effective. 87
¶35
Closely tied to the above is the fact that a lack of coordination of international aid
currently impedes the efficient and effective use of aid. 88 The need for large-scale, long
81

See sources cited supra note 80 for facts, figures and stories of the disaster and relief efforts.
It has been suggested that economic prosperity or recession may play a part in countries increasing
aid–or meeting their targets–to the developing need world. In this regard, a well-functioning global
economy can be viewed as a precondition to increased aid. See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note
1, at 94.
83
The Global Fund is a partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected
communities created to support international health financing. The Global Fund has, to date, committed
$4.9 billion in 131 countries to support aggressive interventions against all three. For more information, see
The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
84
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual Property Order Enters the
21st Century, 29 VANDERBILT J. TRANSN ’L L. 471 (1996).
85
See generally UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, and specifically the recommendations on
pages 147-49.
86
This now widely cited figure was first pledged in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution and has been
affirmed many times, including at the International Conference on Financing for Development in
Monterrey, Mexico at paragraph 42 and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
at page 52. In 2004, the total ODA to developing countries increased 4.6% from the previous year to $78.6
billion, a figure which represents only 0.25% of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members'
combined GNI. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Official Development
Assistance increases further--but 2006 Targets Still a Challenge,
http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,2340,en_2649_201185_34700611_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2007).
87
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 104.
88
A number of efforts also discount the need for effective community inclusion, participation and
empowerment in any international efforts. See, e.g., id. at 101. However, a WHO study found that the more
successful aid efforts involve the local community and most also respond to an area of need, on the request
82
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term assistance and aid is well known and understood, but the present system of
distributing aid and assistance is disparate, wasteful and lacking transparency. 89 The
current system sees groups and organisations competing with each other and duplicating
technical, research and on the ground efforts. 90 In short, useful information and analysis
is not well known or published and experiences within organisations, nations or regions
are not transferred to others. Not only does this damage and marginalize aid efforts, but
it also makes it hard to get adequate levels of assistance and even maintain sufficient
quality of drugs. 91 A properly administered system which increases coordination and
transparency of activities would improve the situation by combining resources and efforts
to maximize efficiency and targeted assistance. While financing is certainly imperative
to controlling the pubic health crisis in the developing world, it is not the only global
initiative in which nations must engage. Other positive actions that developed countries
and international bodies such as the WHO and UN could take to control the crises in the
developing world include negotiations and planning efforts with the heads of the affected
developing nations to devise strategic plans to distribute funds efficiently and effectively
in those affected countries. 92
B. Political commitment from developing nations
¶36

The burden and responsibility for alleviating the public health crisis in the
developing world should not fall solely on developed country governments. On the
contrary, important to any effort is a concurrent political commitment from the
governments of the developing nations in the midst of widespread epidemics to control
and alleviate the problem. At present, it is clear that there is an inadequate level of
national commitment of developing country governments to prioritize healthcare. 93 Like
many of the other barriers listed in this section, the lack of commitment transcends
of the beneficiary country. See generally WHO, GUIDELINES FOR DRUG DONATIONS (1999),
http://www.drugdonations.org/eng/richtlijnen/eng_guidelinesdrugdonation.pdf.
89
See ROY W IDDUS & KATHERINE W HITE, COMBATING DISEASES A SSOCIATED WITH POVERTY:
FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS 23 (Abr. ver. 2004), available at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/ippph/CombatingDiseases.pdf; UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT
2005, supra note 1, at 5-6, 30, 42-45, 63.
90
For a specific example, see Widdus & White, supra note 89, at 21-22.
91
See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 41, 100; Patrice Troullier et al., Drug
Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public Policy Failure, 359 THE LANCET
2188 (2002); see generally W ARREN A. KAPLAN, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS ON
PHARMACEUTICAL A CCESS AND QUALITY: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE AND WHERE A RE THE GAPS IN OUR
KNOWLEDGE ? (2003), available at
http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/richardl/RPM+_Project/Regulation&QA/Regulation-evidence-Feb2003.doc;
WHO CMH, M ACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(2001), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidcmh/CMHReport.pdf [hereinafter WHO CMH 2001].
92
A possible avenue for the distribution of funding could be to establish domestic manufacturers in nonproducing countries to save these countries from relying on TRIPS mechanisms for imports of generic
versions of drugs. However, there is evidence to suggest that this would not be a viable expenditure of
funding due to the need for the drugs to meet an internationally recognized quality standard, which would
make it difficult for these producers to offer competitive prices. See BROOK BAKER, DFID HEALTH SYS.
RES. CT R., PROCESSES AND ISSUES FOR IMPROVING A CCESS TO M EDICINES: W ILLINGNESS AND A BILITY TO
UTILISE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN NON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES (2004), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Baker_TRIPS_Flex.pdf.
93
See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 29.
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boundaries and depends upon a number of factors. Reasons for the lack of prioritization,
however, include a lack of political will by policymakers, blatant corruption at every
level of the public sector, 94 a lack of health infrastructure or even pre-conditions
necessary for adequate healthcare, restrictive donor programs, large scale debt
repayments, and strict conditions for loans from international financial institutions that
may have the effect of further precluding basic social service needs of citizens. 95
¶37
The lack of political will of developing countries combined with a lack of capacity
to deliver proper healthcare solutions is the most prominent detriment to resolving,
alleviating or even lessening the health crises. 96 At present, even when essential vaccines
and medicines are heavily discounted or even donated to developing markets, the cost of
transportation, storage and administration of vaccines and medicines often cost more than
the drugs themselves. 97
¶38
Evidence indicates that the majority of developing countries and LDCs lack the
economic foundation to sustain a properly functioning public health climate, which
includes the costs of purchasing, storing, transporting, and administering needed
medicines. 98 For instance, LDCs, on average, spend approximately US$11 per capita on
health99 – as compared with $US93 for lower middle- income nations and $US1,907 for
developed nations – thus, even when pharmaceutical companies donate necessary drugs

94

In 2006, Forbes magazine named Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the president of troubled
Equatorial Guinea, as the eighth wealthiest leader in the world with an estimated wealth of $600 million. In
addition, while oil was discovered in 1995, little money has reportedly been released outside the Obiang
family and the country has declined in almost all UN standards over the last decade. It must also be noted
that American-owned Riggs Bank was fined for not reporting possible money laundering following the
deposit of over $700 million following the discovery of oil. The money was released to Obiang. Obiang
and his immediate family also recently owned two multi-million dollar homes in Maryland and the
Obiang’s son reportedly paid $700,000 to rent Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen’s yacht, Tatoosh. Luisa
Kroll, Fortunes of Kings, Queens and Dictators, Forbes.com, May 4, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/2006/05/04/rich-kings-dictators_cz_lk_0504royals.html. It is also
widely believed that former Indonesian President Suharto embezzled more than $10 billion during his 33year dictatorship; Zaire’s (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) former leader Mobutu Sese Seko,
overthrown in a 1997 revolt, was reputed to be worth between $4-8 billion; Former Philippine Ferdinand
Marcos apparently embezzled $5 billion in government funds during his 20 years in power. Less than $1
billion was ever recovered after his overthrow. See Arik Hesseldahl, How Dictators Manage Their Billions,
Forbes.com, June 22, 2000, http://www.forbes.com/2000/06/22/feat.html.
95
For instance, the IMF has repeatedly recommended that countries limit their health expenditures as a
means to combat inflation as a condition to a loan. UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 96.
96
The TRIPS Agreement provides significant flexibilities and wide discretion for determining public
health policy and even the conditions of compulsory licensing laws. See SISULE M USUNGU & CECILIA OH,
THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE A CCESS TO
M EDICINES (2005), available at www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.
97
See Mercurio, supra note 16, at 246-47.
98
For statistics on worldwide poverty, see Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, How Have the World’s
Poorest Fared Since the Early 1980s?, 19(2) World Bank Res. Observer 141–70 (2004).
99
In some countries, the situation is even more dire. For instance, in Cote d’Ivoire, a discounted
treatment for AIDS cost $3.48 per day, but in a country where the average GDP per day is $1.94 and donor
assistance only adds $0.03 per day, the price still makes the drug unattainable. UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT
2005, supra note 1, at 65. WIPO states: “Even reducing the price of HIV/AIDS treatments to cover the
costs of basic manufacturing and distribution alone–as was recently done in a number of countries hardest
hit by the crisis –still keeps the cost of annual treatments at between $350 and $600 per year. These prices,
which are similar to the cost of generic versions of the same drugs and make no provision for recouping the
cost of research and development, are still above the annual per capita incomes of some countries with high
levels of HIV/AIDS.” WIPO No. 491(E) , supra note 63.
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to these countries, these developing countries still cannot afford the storage and
administrative costs associated with receiving the drugs. 100
¶39
The poor level of existing infrastructure in many developing countries is evidenced
by inadequate health facilities, lack of hospital beds and laboratories, lack of trained
medical and laboratory staff 101 and incomplete or non-existent drug distribution
systems. 102 Inefficient use of aid and resources, poor management and little oversight of
existing programs is also a large impediment to maintaining a properly functioning public
health system. 103 Additionally, it must be noted that in order to see any meaningful
progress, significant monetary resources must also be expended to meet the most
fundamental of needs for food and clean water to remove some of the conditions leading
to illness and disease and to build the necessary medical infrastructure to enable the
provision of adequate health services. 104
¶40
Developing countries do not have the monetary resources to combat these health
problems. 105 As illustrated throughout this article, developing countries need assistance
in alleviating poverty, minimizing social disruptions, overcoming inconsistent donor aid
and encouraging research and development on diseases primarily afflicting the
developing world in order to eliminate or at the very least lessen the burden and create a
situation more conducive to the provision of health services. Developing countries,
however, can help themselves in this process. The first step in finding a long term
solution to the problem is for governments in the developing world stricken with health
crises to adopt a national medicines policy. 106 The design and implementation of this
100

Alan Moran, Trade Laws and Pharmaceuticals, 53(4) INST . PUB. A FF. REV. 25, 26 (2001); WHO
CMH 2001, supra note 91; INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), FURTHER VIEWS ON CROSS
BORDER COMPULSORY LICENSING 8 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/icc_paper_aug03_e.pdf. There is “increasing international
agreement that $30 per capita represents the lower bound [needed to provide health services].” UN
M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 63. The price of the cheapest generic triple cocktail to combat
HIV/AIDS, on offer by Indian manufacturer Cipla, costs $350 per person per year. See Ph RMA 2002,
supra note 75 (PhRMA said the marketing and selling of drugs without any price differential to developing
countries is cruel and costs lives. One example of this is the marketing of a Hepatitis C treatment at
$30,000 a year. This makes the drug unaffordable to most governments and creates a situation whereby
only the wealthy citizens can afford treatment.); MSF 2005, supra note 60.
101
The shortage of trained medical practitioners, nurses, aids, technicians, pharmacists, and pharmacy
technicians is “a growing problem that, if unaddressed, threatens to undermine all efforts to strengthen
health systems and improve healthcare in much of the developing world.” UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005,
supra note 1, at 30.
102
See, e.g., UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 80-81.
103
Prescription practices in several developing countries have been referred to as wasteful and
dangerous. For example, for every $30 of medicine reaching its target (through donations or otherwise),
$15 is squandered and $3 more is lost on non-compliance by patients. See id. at 86, 88.
104
See generally W ORLD BANK, IMPROVING HEALTH, NUTRITION A ND POPULATION OUTCOMES IN SUBSAHARAN A FRICA (2005). In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the UN set eight goals for
development (the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs) and an agenda for improving the human
condition by 2015. See UN Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 4, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (2000). More on the MDGs can be found at the UN Millennium Project website,
supra note 10.
105
For instance, donations and other aid reportedly account for 52% of Uganda’s national budget. See
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 39.
106
The Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines calls this a “necessary component of an
overall health policy.” UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 95. The World Bank has defined
such policies as existing to ensure that “safe and effective drugs of good quality are available and
affordable to the entire population and that they are rationally used.” Id. at 32 (citing W ORLD BANK,
W ORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993: INVESTING IN HEALTH (1993), available at http://www-
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policy should enable the country to meet its national health needs as well as be simplistic
enough to enable its realisation. 107 One part of this policy should be a strategy for
providing essential medicines to citizens. The importance of such a government policy
initiative cannot be understated, as policies and programmes initiated to increase access
to essential medicines or to improve the health of a nation can rarely succeed without the
support and understanding of all levels of government. For instance, an ambitious health
policy without financial support from the government, proper infrastructure and resources
for training healthcare workers, sufficiently salaried public servants (including but
certainly not limited to healthcare workers), and the implementation of trade, taxation and
customs policies creating conditions conducive to smoothly facilitate the improvement of
health conditions, is likely to fail. 108 Moreover, institutions such as the police, the
judiciary and regulatory bodies must be adequately financed in order to stem rampant
corruption. In addition, and importantly, countries must recognize the effect of civil
instability on public health (displaced citizenry, lack of and poor quality water, food
shortages and a lack of quality medicine and health services). Simply stated, efforts
aimed at resolving the problem of access to essential medicines problems will be fruitless
if there is a lack of political commitment in the affected developing nation to refocus
priorities to the health, or even the public, sector. 109
¶41
In order to alleviate the situation, governments must also reorientate their priorities
and devote more of their scarce resources to meeting the health needs of their citizens.
The need for such a reorientation is evidenced by relatively low budgeting for and
expenditures on public health110 which in turn causes shortages of storage facilities,
transportation networks, and medical equipment and personnel. 111 In addition, in many
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_ IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000009265_3970716142319).
107
The Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines states that such a policy must be
“comprehensive and well-planned” and employ “well-proven principles” based on the essential medicines
concept as adopted to the needs of the individual country. Effective monitoring of the system’s
implementation is also crucial to its success. Id. at 95-96. See also WHO, Framework for Action, 2(1)
WHO POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES 2 (2002).
108
See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 32. The Working Group also noted several
other crucial factors which impact upon the success of a national health policy, namely: the understanding
of local conditions, long-term (local and international) support from the public and private sectors, the
prioritization and targeting of access to medicines, and sufficient data and analysis in order to identify and
target critical problems and barriers. Id. at 95. For a detailed analysis of the problem of healthcare workers
see WHO, W ORKING TOGETHER FOR HEALTH: THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2006/whr06_en.pdf.
109
See WHO 2004, supra note 3. Thus, in many developing countries, wealthy citizens who can afford
to be treated privately have access to essential medicines while poorer citizens who rely on the public
health system are deprived of essential medicines and treatments. See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005,
supra note 1, at 95.
110
See M ARTIN FOREMAN, BEYOND OUR MEANS? THE COST OF TREATING HIV/AIDS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 13 (2000). Compounding the problem is the heavy debt burden of many developing
nations. For details and figures, see Jubilee Debt Campaign, http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk (last
visited Jan. 2, 2007).
111
It has been estimated that over 20,000 health professionals annually emigrate from Africa. UN
M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 97. This contributes to the continent spending $4 billion on
100,000 foreign health workers annually. Id. The reasons behind the emigration include: doctors being
more skilled and advanced than required by local populations (little intellectual stimulation); poor
remuneration; lack of incentives to stay or return home; security threats, violence and safety; education for
children; poor working conditions; oppressive political climate; persecution of intellectuals, discrimination;
lack of research funding and poor facilities; and limited career options. To reverse this trend, the PHP calls
for the establishment of full fee-paying universities to train doctors for export, increased training, increased
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parts of the developing world, corruption on the part of high level government officials or
poorly paid public servants prevents the drugs from reaching the intended beneficiaries.112
The impact of corruption in the health network of developing countries is significant and
costly, both in monetary and human terms, and often prevents even the cheapest of
treatments from reaching hospitals and patients. 113 A reorientation of resources could
also fund (with the assistance of international aid) increased educational efforts, the
dissemination of information and in-service training as well as better retention of skilled
workers (and hopefully decrease the incidence of corruption) and compensation schemes
for countries that lose health workers.
¶42
Another significant burden to the access of essential medicines is the fact that
governments of many developing countries place tariffs, levies, duties and other taxes on
pharmaceutical drugs and equipment crossing into their borders, thereby significantly
raising the price of the drugs for patients in their own countries. 114 For instance, while the
average tariff on medicines is 18%, several developing countries and LDCs levy much
higher rates on medicines entering their respective countries. 115 For example, the
incredibly poor Democratic Republic of the Congo levies a 30% duty on all drugs
crossing its borders, with further taxes adding at least another 13% to the final price at
which the drugs can be provided to its citizens. 116 Moreover, other countries in the midst
of public health crises such as India, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Bolivia also impose
significant tariffs on the importation of pharmaceuticals at 55%, 40%, 34% and 32%
respectively. 117 Examples of governments that charge excessive sales tax on medicines
include South Africa (14%), Argentina (21%), Bangladesh (15%), the Dominican
Republic (28%), Greece (15%) and Turkey (18%). 118 Perhaps worst of all is India,
which, having more than 3 million HIV/AIDS cases and only 17,000 patients being
regularly treated, charges at least 25% duty on medicines. 119 In total, large mark-ups are
being paid even when tariff rates are low or even zero. 120 Incredibly, Kenya, Morocco
salaries and support (housing, transport, etc.) and improving and stimulating the working environment
(computers, journals, etc.). Id.
112
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 29, 96-98, 148. For instance, a reported 25% of
discounted drugs sent to Africa from GlaxoSmithKline between June 2001 and July 2002 failed to reach
their intended destination. Carol C. Adelman, et al., Myths and Realities on Prices of AIDS Drugs, HUDSON
INST . 13 (2004) [hereinafter Adelman, et al., Myths and Realities].
113
See, e.g., FOREMAN, supra note 110, at 16.
114
See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Report of the High Commissioner,
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001). Moreover, border delays
caused by the facilitation of customs requirements pertaining to tariffs and taxes sometimes result in the
medicines expiring during the delays or suffering medicinal degradation due to suboptimal storage facilities
(such as heat, cold, humidity or light). See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 80.
115
Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS Treatment, supra note 62, at 10.
116
Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 3.
117
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 80.
118
See Roger Bate, The Sick are Taxed to Death in Poor Countries, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), May 31,
2004, available at http://www.fightingmalaria.org/news.php?ID=261 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).
119
See id.; Roger Bate, Taxed to Death, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Short
Publications, Jul. 5, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24624/pub_detail.asp. For more
details and similar statistics on a number of other nations, see Adelman et al., The Full Cost of HIV/AIDS
Treatment, supra note 62, at 10-12.
120
For instance, pharmaceuticals enter Sri Lanka, Kenya and Armenia duty free, but the final mark-up in
those countries due to other taxes and the like is 64%, 54.2% and 87.5%, respectively. See Adelman et al.,
Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 11.
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and Peru impose such high levels of tariff and taxes on imported medications that the
citizens of those countries pay a higher price than the domestic market of the drugs’
manufacture – even with price differentiation. 121
¶43
As a result of the application of tariffs and taxes, the actual price of imported
medicines in certain developing countries can be over 50% more than the reported value
of the drug. To illustrate, when the Clinton Foundation in October 2003 “brokered” a
deal to lower the price of an HIV drug treatment to US$140 a person a year, the final
price at which the drugs were provided to citizens was, at its lowest, US$277 in
Cameroon. 122 In Mozambique, the price was US$389 and in Honduras it was US$426. 123
¶44
Quite obviously, a simple step that every government can take to lower the costs of
pharmaceutical drugs and equipment is to lower tariffs, levies, duties and other taxes that
raise the price, and therefore reduce access of the medicines to its populace. 124 The
argument that the countries which levy significant tariffs need the revenues is
intellectually shallow, short-sighted and reveals the priority the countries have placed on
public health. The unnecessary raising of prices of essential medicines through tariffs
and other taxes is without question unconscionable and a continuing cause of the
significant loss of life.
¶45
Reducing tariffs and taxes on the importation of pharmaceuticals and related
products, as well as improving the distribution of health products and services, and
maintaining quality of the pharmaceutical supply through reliable testing facilities are
key issues which governments must address in the fight to improve the lives of many in
the developing world. 125 While most, if not all, developing countries need financial
assistance to meet these standards, it is clear that “some developing countries have
aggregate national resources sufficient to meet all the primary healthcare needs of their
citizens, yet non- health priorities are … given precedence.”126 Unfortunately, the barrier
of lack of political will demonstrated by the governments of several countries to address
the public health crises in their countries is a problem for which there is not a clear
solution. States cannot generally interfere in the activities of other States and so there is
little that the governments of othe r nations can do to stop the mismanagement and
corruption that is prevalent in many developing countries or to change the cultural views
that impede access to essential medicines and a proper health infrastructure. 127 If much of
the monopoly that funds the lavish exercises of government officials in developing
countries is diverted to build medical infrastructure and control the epidemic diseases
prevalent, then together with commitment from developed countries and the international
121

See W ORLD HEALTH ORG. & HEALTH A CTION INT ’L, MEDICINE PRICES — A NEW APPROACH TO
M EASUREMENT 99-100 (2003), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2003/WHO_ EDM_PAR_2003.2.pdf for the price survey methodology.
122
Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 4.
123
Id. at 5.
124
See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 81 (stating “[t]axes and tariffs on essential
medicines should be eliminated; they negatively affect affordability and competition”).
125
See id. at 63-64. For problems of distribution, particularly to rural areas, and the role of NGOs in
assisting with their own distribution systems, see id. at 80-81.
126
Id. at 39.
127
For example, since 2000, only two African countries (Uganda and Botswana) have accepted an offer
by German pharmaceutical company Boehringer Ingelheim to provide free donations of an anti-retroviral
drug designed to prevent pregnant women suffering from HIV/AIDS from infecting their unborn babies.
Geoff Dyer, Only Two African States Take Up Aids Offer, FIN. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 8.
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community, the suffering of millions may be eased. However, considering that in some
developing nations, governments have not been elected democratically, changing the
political situation will be difficult. The most that can be done is for the international
community to place pressure on these governments to make a commitment to their
citizens to alleviate the worsening situation. However, as mentioned above, the lack of
commitment from developing country governments may be impeding increased aid from
the developed world.
¶46
Another method developing countries can utilize to reduce expenditures on drugs is
regional negotiation using potential purchasing power as an advantage. While this
strategy may not be appropriate in every setting, regional negotiating efforts have proven
to be successful in the eastern Caribbean. 128 It has been noted, however, that such a
strategy requires, among other things, significant purchasing power, homogeneity of
members, financial stability, prediction of needs, loyalty and monitoring. 129 However,
even if countries cannot make use of bargaining strengths, all developing countries can
guarantee price transparency when purchasing drugs and medical supplies to ensure, inter
alia, competition and rational decision making. 130
¶47
In a perfect world, developing countries would be able to ease the ongoing health
crises by simply increasing local production of pharmaceuticals but the reality is that this
involves large capital investment, basic infrastructure capable of supporting such a
venture, trained technical staff and ongoing costs, i.e., maintaining quality and standards.
In addition, competition is fierce in the global pharmaceutical market and a developing
country start- up faces many challenges. Thus, despite a World Bank report deeming it
technically feasible for a developing country to build a pharmaceutical industry, it is
doubtful whether it will be able to compete with the already established industries in
India and Brazil, among others. 131
¶48
That said, numerous benefits can result from having a local industry and
establishing such an industry is an option which should be explored by developing
countries. 132 For example, native industries have recently been promoting technology
128

See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 77.
Id.
130
For more on the necessary elements of price transparency, see id. at 76; see also MSF, UNTANGLING
THE W EB OF PRICE REDUCTIONS: A PRICING GUIDE FOR THE PURCHASE OF ARVS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (8th ed. 2005), available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/untanglingtheweb%208.pdf.
131
In order for such a plan to succeed, technology transfers, increased research capacity and increased
manufacturing capabilities all need to be received or addressed.
132
It is worth noting that generic and counterfeit drugs manufactured in developing countries are often
of substandard quality, dangerous, or even lethal. See WHO, M EDICINES STRATEGY : COUNTRIES AT THE
CORE 2004-2007 5, 90, 95, 97, 104-06, 143 (2004), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO_EDM_2004.5.pdf (citing recent WHO assessments that found
50% -90% of samples of antimalarial drugs failed quality control tests and more than half of ARVs assessed
did not meet international standards); WHO, WHO Factsheet No. 275, Substandard and Counterfeit
Medicines, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/en/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); Liza
Gibson, Drug Regulators Study Global Treaty to Tackle Counterfeit Drugs, 328 BRIT . M ED. J. 486 (2004)
(reporting that counterfeit drugs account for 40 to 50% of all drugs sold in Nigeria and Pakistan).
International standards have been formulated (and supported by the WHO), such as GMP and International
Conference on Harmonization (ICH), in an attempt to maintain proper quality and safety standards in the
production of drugs in the developing world. While such standards are complex and increase production
costs, they save lives. At present, only a minority of manufacturing facilities are in compliance with the
standards and the international community must convince manufacturers to meet the standards (for
example, by procurement agencies insisting the standards be met before purchasing the drugs and by
129
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transfers and participating more directly in research and development of diseases
afflicting the local population. 133 In addition, generic industries in such countries as
Brazil have acted to lower the price of drugs in recent years. 134 Brazil also successfully
reduced the price of several drugs by threatening to issue a compulsory licence unless the
patent holder reduced the price of the drug in question. 135 In each instance, the patent
holder eventually succumb ed to the threat because Brazil has the technological capacity
and well-established generic pharmaceutical industry to manufacture sufficient quantities
of the drug in question. 136 Without a native industry, such threats would merely be idle
and could not be acted upon. 137
¶49
Unfortunately, all of the above (as well as international efforts) will be for naught if
simple information regarding infectious diseases fails to be effectively communicated to
the populace. In this regard, the governments of the developing world have failed and
this failure is no more apparent than in South Africa, which until 2002 denied that HIV
caused AIDS. 138 More recently, former South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma, in
his trial for allegedly raping an AIDS activist, admitted to having unprotected sex with
the woman despite knowing that she was infected with HIV. 139 Moreover, Zuma – who
facility inspections). In addition, the prequalification of producers should be further explored (with a
removal process) by the standard-setting bodies and the WHO. The manufacture and sale of substandard
and counterfeit medicines is also a large problem in the developing world. Some countries facilitate this
problem by having weak governmental regulatory agencies handle procurement and importation schemes.
Substandard medicines are sometimes the result of unintentional error. At other times, it is intentional,
misleading conduct which produces the inadequate drugs (this is particularly the case in India, where
Schedule Y of India’s Drug and Cosmetics Act does not even require toxicity or bioequivalence data for
drugs being exported). Substandard medicines are a major problem, as they lead to resistance and deaths.
Inspection and both civil and criminal penalties are needed to reduce the proliferation of inadequate
medicines. In addition, procurement, customs, and regulatory agencies must be provided with adequate
resources to enforce laws, and the judicial system needs to be equipped to handle such cases.
133
For instance, several initiatives have been formed involving developing country research
centers/universities, universities in developed countries and pharmaceutical companies (such as one
initiative involving the Kenya Medical Research Institutes collaboration with GlaxoSmithKline and the
University of Liverpool for an anti-malaria treatment). See Prescription for Healthy Development:
Increasing Access to Medicines, supra note 1, at 11.
134
See MSF 2004, supra note 1.
135
See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Defensive Drug Industry Fuels Fight Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, April 20,
2001, at A6; Mark Drajem, Brazil Pushes Merck, Pfizer to Cut Drug Costs Amid WTO Talks,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 28, 2003,
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a_804W5JtnZc&refer=us; Paulo Prado, Brazil
Again Seeks to Cut Cost of AIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/business/19abbott.html?ex=1165035600&en=07473c1d770ae211&ei
=5070. For similar reports and newspaper articles, see http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/brazil/. See also
Paul Vandoren & Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, The WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 6 J. OF W ORLD INTELL. PROP . 779, 793 (2003).
136
Both South Africa and Kenya have likewise received voluntary licenses for the same reason. UN
M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 62.
137
This strategy does have its limitations, as the voluntary license provides the drugs at a lower cost than
previously obtainable, but does not involve any technology transfer or facilitate the development of a
technologically improved domestic industry. Id.
138
AIDS Ignorance, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 17A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-05-10-aids-edit_x.htm [hereinafter AIDS
Ignorance].
139
Manoah Esipisu & Rebecca Harrison, South Africa's Zuma Acquitted of Rape, THE BOSTON GLOBE ,
May 8, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2006/05/08/safrica_set_for_verdict_in_zuma_rape_trial/
?rss_id=Boston.com+%2F+News.
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once headed South Africa’s anti-AIDS campaign – testified that he “took a shower” after
the sexual encounter to diminish the risk of infection. 140 Furthermore, South Africa
continues to promote lemons, beetroot, garlic and other traditional medicine as
HIV/AIDS preventative medicine while at the same time publicly criticizing the side
effects of ARV drugs. 141 Such practices recently drew the ire of the international
community at several AIDS conferences, where its policies and drug delivery record
were chastised and for embracing theories worthy of the “lunatic fringe.”142 With such
ignorance shown by the leaders of South Africa, it is questionable whether any
coordinated effort will be effective until domestic knowledge is substantially improved.
C. Innovative financing solutions for new medicines
¶50

In addition to patent protection, the pharmaceutical industry has also often been a
scapegoat for the lack of access to life-saving drugs in the developing world, with many
asserting that the industry should devote more resources to illnesses and diseases
affecting developing countries. 143 This criticism is overly simplistic and does not
accurately reflect the situation. For instance, 77% of the WHO Essential Drugs List
between 1977 and 2002 originated or were substantially developed by the pharmaceutical
industry. 144 In addition, as noted above, pharmaceutical companies routinely sell
pharmaceuticals at heavily reduced prices to developing countries in order to promote
goodwill and, in all probability, to counter the negative publicity the industry has
received in recent years. However, even the most ardent critic should realize that it is
unrealistic to ask the industry to incur losses ad infinitum. But the situation of donations
and voluntary reductions of pricing is different than one which requires the industry to
discount or donate its product or to forgo its patent rights in that such a mandate results in
a de facto discriminatory tax on the industry; such a de facto tax would place the
pharmaceutical industry at a significant disadvantage in its ability to compete for capital
and other resources with other industries. 145 Much like every other industry, one can only
expect the pharmaceutical companies to continue researching and developing new drugs
to combat health problems associated with the developing world when it can expect a
reasonable return on its investment.

140

AIDS Ignorance, supra note 138.
See, e.g., Beetroot But No Blushes, ECONOMIST , Aug. 24, 2006, at 40. South Africa’s health minister,
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, recently stated: “Raw garlic and a skin of the lemon--not only do they give
you a beautiful face and skin but they also protect you from [HIV/ AIDS].” Sarah Boseley, Aids Groups
Condemn South Africa's “Dr Garlic,” THE GUARDIAN (London), May 6, 2005, at 16.
142
Id.
143
While respectable NGOs such as MSF acknowledge other factors relating to a lack of research and
development for certain diseases, they still highlight the pharmaceutical industries’ spending patterns. See
e.g., MSF, R & D SYSTEM IS FAILING TO M EET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MSF BRIEFING
NOTE FOR M INISTERIAL SUMMIT ON HEALTH RESEARCH, M EXICO CITY, 16-20 NOVEMBER, 2004 (2005),
available at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=121120041119152&contenttype=PARA&.
144
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 137 (industry dissent).
145
See Mercurio, supra note 16, at 248-253; see also WIPO No. 491(E), supra note 63, at 1: (“A robust
patent system providing for adequate patent protection is an indispensable incentive to creative and
inventive work and is crucial to establishing and maintaining an attractive commercial environment.”);
DFID, supra note 56, at 5-6.
141
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¶51

On the other hand, it is well known that research and development of medicines and
vaccines to address health problems of developing countries is inadequate. The main
problem with the current system is that patents do not provide sufficient research
incentives where the market for the product is insufficient. In such a circumstance, even
though the pharmaceutical industry appears to be genuinely making an attempt to develop
vaccinations and drugs to treat several developing country diseases, 146 the fact of the
matter remains that these vaccines and drugs are either non-existent or no longer effective
due to resistance. 147 Quite obviously, the lack of innovation in this area is at least partly
responsible for prolonging the public health crises in the developing world. 148 Again, the
current incentive structure promoting research and development of medicines and
vaccines to address health problems of developing countries is deficient. 149
¶52
In order to ensure sustained research and development into the afflictions of the
developing world and widespread access to the resulting drugs, health priorities must be
re-oriented and incentives provided for the industry or pharmaceutical companies will
eventually exit the market, thus reducing the number of new drugs to service the
developing world. 150 Despite much publicized rhetoric, simply expropriating the
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies is not the long-term solution.
This point is illustrated by using an analogy to the expropriation of a foreign-owned
manufacturing plant or a foreign-owned bank account. Such expropriation would
inevitably result in less foreign investment in the country. Likewise, the expropriation of
a company’s intellectual property results in less research and development into medicines
to prevent and treat diseases afflicting the expropriating country.
146

See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 139 (industry dissent). The pharmaceutical
industry states: “[We] continue to play an important role in development of medicines for malaria, TB, and
other diseases occurring primarily in developing countries. For example, Novartis recently established a
research centre in Singapore for the discovery and development of drugs for tropical diseases, with and
initial focus on TB and dengue fever. When drugs are finally produced, they will be sold at no profit. Astra
Zeneca has created a new discovery research facility in Bangalore, India, which will focus exclusively on
TB. GlaxoSmithKline has a dedicated facility in Tres Cantos, Spain, for drug discovery in diseases of the
developing world, including malaria and TB. They currently have two antimalarial drugs in development
(phases I and III) as well as vaccines in clinical trials for TB and malaria. Much of this work is in
association with public-private partnerships that offer a new and innovative approach to drug and vaccine
development—a development barely cited in the report.”
147
For more information, see the WHO webpage on drug resistance. WHO, Drug Resistance,
http://www.who.int/drugresistance/en/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2006); see also, Carol C. Adelman et al.,
Myths and Realities, supra note 112, 13-16.
148
See, e.g., MSF, A CCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN AND THE DRUG FOR NEGLECTED
DISEASES W ORKING GROUP , FATAL IMBALANCE : THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS
FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES (2001), available at www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatalshort.pdf . For
more on the cost of combating the AIDS crisis, see UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT , REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON HIV/AIDS, M ALARIA , TB, AND A CCESS TO ESSENTIAL M EDICINES, W ORKING GROUP ON
HIV/AIDS: COMBATING AIDS IN THE DEVELOPING W ORLD, 129-49 (2005), available at
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/HIVAIDS-complete.pdf.
149
See GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2003-2004
(2004), available at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/002__What%20we%20do/005__Publications/001__10%2090%20r
eports.php (PDF form of THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2003-2004 is available on the right
side of the webpage by chapter) (reporting that approximately 90% of the research and development of
health research goes to diseases afflicting mainly the developed world); Condon & Sinha, supra note 13.
150
See Mercurio, supra note 16, at 251; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), PATENTS AND INNOVATION : TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGE 9 (2004), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf [hereinafter OECD 2004] (stating “[e]mpirical
evidence tends to support the effectiveness of patents in encouraging innovation”).
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¶53

It is also too simplistic to demand that the pharmaceutical company expend more
resources on researching and developing drugs relating to developing country diseases.
The pharmaceutical industry is like very few in the world where research and
development and trials account for 30% of total production costs and where a rigorous
regulatory process is necessary before the products can be marketed and sold. 151 This
procedure guarantees the safety and effectiveness of the drugs, but in the process renders
much of the research and development expenditure by the industry essentially wasted as
the vast majority of drugs fail to reach the market. In fact, only 5 of every 250
compounds that enter preclinical testing make it to clinical trials, with over half failing
the clinical trial stage and an additional large number failing the regulatory stage. 152 For
those drugs proven to be safe and effective, the process of navigating through the trials
and regulatory stage takes years and millions of dollars, and all this takes place while the
period of exclusivity granted by the patent is dwindling. 153 Pharmaceutical companies
can only ever hope to generate modest profits in the developing world, but it may be that
modest profit is vital to ensure that research and development continues for certain
diseases. 154 Therefore, a period of restricted competition is required for the recoup ment
of research and development and regulatory costs, as well as for the making of small
profits in order to encourage future creation and ensure that some suppliers do not exit
the market entirely. 155 However, where a market is incapable of paying for the treatment,
patents do not provide the necessary impetus to encourage research and development. In
such a circumstance, incentives must be provided to the pharmaceutical industry or
directly funded by governments, international organizations or from other sources.
¶54
In this regard, the problem with access to medicines in the developing world is twofold: (1) developing countries either cannot afford to purchase existing drugs or do not
have the infrastructure to safely store, transport and administer the drugs; and (2) there
are no existing drugs to prevent or treat diseases mainly afflicting the developing world.
151

See Moran, supra note 100, at 25. The industry estimates that it spends approximately 17% or more
of sales on research and development, a figure three times more than the next highest-spending industry
(telecommunications), and four times more than the defence industry and all other industries. See PHRMA,
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2003 (2003), available at http://www.phrmajp.org/publication/pdf/industry/2003/2003FRONT.pdf.
152
PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2006, 2, 5-6 (2006), available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/2006%20Industry%20Profile.pdf.
153
The pharmaceutical industry reports the average effective life of a patent as being 11.5 years. Id. at 8.
154
The OECD referred to patents as an “essential factor” in the development of new medicines. More
specifically, an OECD report stated that patents were important to start-ups and university spin-offs in the
biomedical field for the protection and raising of capital. The report did warn, however, that patent
protection could lead to overly strong regulatory positions. See OECD 2004, supra note 150; see also John
P. Walsh et al., Science and the Law: Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI . 1021 (2003) (finding
that although IPRs create complexities, they are a necessary stimulus, have never caused research to halt
midstream and can be effectively managed).
155
See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J.
INT ’L L. 47, 57 (2002). A survey of “executives in a range of industries were asked to estimate what
percentage of inventions . . . in the early-1980s would not have been developed without [adequate] patent
protection.” Id. The survey revealed that 14% of all products would not have been invented, but that 60%
of pharmaceutical products would not have been developed without patent protection. Id. at 60-61 (citation
omitted). See also Roy Widdus, Product Development Partnerships on “Neglected Diseases”: How They
Handle Intellectual Property and How This May Contribute to Improving Access to Pharmaceuticals for
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, ICTSD-INCTAD DIALOGUE ON ENSURING POLICY OPTIONS FOR A FFORDABLE
A CCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (2004), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Widdus_Bellagio3_revised.pdf.
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¶55

An example of developing countries not being able to afford existing treatment
options can be seen from the recent advances of ARV drugs in the treatment of
HIV/AIDS. Thus, while there is still no cure for the disease, it has been effectively
controlled in the developed world largely due to the availability of modern ARV drugs. 156
Studies have shown that the mortality rate in the United States has declined by over 75%
over three years through the use of ARV drug cocktails. 157 Patients in developing
countries, however, can neither afford the wide range of drugs available on the developed
country market, nor do they have the facilities or the means to effectively administer the
few drugs that they do have access to. For these reasons, the epidemic remains
uncontrolled in the developing world and sub-Saharan Africa alone must contend with
over 25 million people infected with HIV/AIDS (which account for more than 70% of all
HIV/AIDS cases globally). 158
¶56
In this regard, while the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry159 and aid agencies in
either reducing the price, 160 donating drugs or facilitating delivery to developing
countries, 161 are beneficial, ad hoc arrangements are not sufficient. 162 Instead, scale
coordinated, targeted aid and large scale equity pricing schemes must be implemented in
order to guarantee the long-term supply of affordable, quality drugs to the developing
world. 163 Under equity pricing, countries and regions would only pay what they can
afford while continuing to make use of voluntary and compulsory licences, negotiating
and transparency in order to ensure the procurement of low cost drugs. 164 In essence,
156

IIPI, supra note 76, at 9.
Id.
158
Id. at 4.
159
Credit must be given to the pharmaceutical industry for their efforts at promoting global healthcare.
For instance, the industry spends between $1.4-2.1 billion dollars annually for global healthcare – a figure
that represents more than a third of the United States’ total healthcare assistance to the developing world.
See PHRMA, GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS: HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
DEVELOPING NATIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/Global_Partnerships_2004.pdf
[hereinafter PH RMA 2004]. In addition, in 2003, industry members of the Partnership for Quality Medical
Donation provided more than $1.4 billion in donated drugs, and in 2002, pharmaceutical companies’ select
humanitarian programs totalled $810 million. See PH RMA, IMPROVING HEALTH IN THE DEVELOPING
W ORLD (2004) (on file with author). More specific donation programs can be seen throughout PHRMA
2004. Id. Overall, the industry provides almost the same, if not more, total aid than most governments and
international health organizations. UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, app. 2, at 138.
160
At least one commentator believes that the reduction in price is, for the most part, not low enough to
be efficiently utilized. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 225-27 (2005). For
statistics on the health budget of some developing countries, see supra text accompanying notes 99 and
100.
161
For instance, UNICEF and the Rockefeller Foundation secure lower prices for drugs and vaccines
due to their procurement practices, warehousing and delivery networks. UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005,
supra note 1, at 78. In fact, UNICEF claims it supplies 40% of the vaccine market for AIDS covering 5%
of market in financial terms. Id. The Stop TB Partnership and Global TB Drug Facility supply the vaccine
market at similar rates for those afflictions. Id.
162
Several studies have shown that small scale donations are, for the most part, not appropriate or
unsustainable for meeting local needs. See, e.g., Phillippe Autier et al., Drug Donations in Post-emergency
Situations, in W ORLD BANK HEALTH, NUTRITION & POPULATION FAMILY (HNP) DI SCUSSION PAPER SERIES
(2002), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/2816271095698140167/Nassery-DrugDonation-whole.pdf.
163
The WHO successfully initiated equity pricing in the 1980s for vaccines and reproductive health. UN
M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 68.
164
See, e.g., WHO Secretariat, More Equitable Pricing for Essential Drugs: What do we Mean and
157
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equity pricing would allow developing countries to procure drugs without having to pay
for development costs, marketing or shareholder returns. More specifically, sales to
lower- income developing countrie s would be at a “no profit, no loss.”165 Middle- income
countries would pay a higher rate for the drugs while the burden on developed countries
would be even greater in order to cover the development costs, marketing and
shareholder returns. 166
¶57
The second, and perhaps more difficult, problem is that a number of diseases
primarily affecting the developing world, i.e., African trypanosomiasis, Chagas disease,
leishmaniasis, and dengue fever, have been neglected by the pharmaceutical industry and
there is either no cure, vaccine or treatment or new medicines available to “address [the]
shortcomings of existing treatments, such as safety, efficacy, appropriate dosing, length
of treatment, and the ongo ing threat of drug resistance.”167 While the international
community (most notably, philanthropic foundations, certain governments and the
pharmaceutical industry) has improved its response and has provided needed resources to
fund research and development for new medicines, more financial resources are needed
on an ongoing basis to “create a strong and sustainable pipeline of new products”. 168 In
this regard, “[n]ew thinking, different means of financing and organizing medicines
development, and other reforms are needed. For example, the WHO Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health should examine alternative
interna tional models to the current patent-based system for priority setting and financing
of health R&D.”169
¶58
In the current climate, for-profit pharmaceutical companies will not reorientate
research priorities. Therefore, incentives in the form of subsidies and other support need
to be given to all those involved in the research and development of essential medicines,
including pharmaceutical manufacturers, academia, government researchers and national
organisations. Industrialized countries must bear the cost of these subsidies. 170 In
addition, alternative intellectual property strategies, such as placing medical innovations
in the public domain, sharing bundles on IPRs, patent pools, patent clearinghouses, public
What are the Issues?, in WHO-WTO SECRETARIAT WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING
OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS, NORWAY, APR. 8-11, 2001 (2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/who_background_e.doc.
165
See UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 18, 68, 115.
166
The extraction of profits from developing countries have been called “both cruel and unnecessary:
cruel because people will die because a life-saving treatment is possible, but unaffordable; unnecessary
because low-income populations would never have contributed much towards global R&D cost recovery in
any case.” Kevin Outterson, Nonrival Access to Pharmaceutical Knowledge (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/KevinOutterson3january.pdf.
167
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 31. MSF states that while over 1200 new chemical
entities have been registered in the world over the past 20 years, only 13 were for tropical diseases. M ARIE
BYSTRÖM & PETER EINARSSON, TRIPS: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, CONSULTANCY REPORT TO THE SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION A GENCY 37 (2001), available at http://ww.grain.org/docs/sida-trips-2001en.pdf. For similar statistics, see Gavin Yamey, Public Sector Must Develop Drugs for Neglected Diseases,
324 BRIT . M ED. J. 698 (2002); Troullier et al., supra note 91; Ellen’t Hoen, Statement by MSF at WIPO
General Assembly (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/msf09302004.html (last visited July 18,
2006).
168
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 31.
169
Id.; see also PRIMO BRAGA & CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS A GREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000).
170
Several studies conclude that current levels of donor assistance are inadequate and must be
substantially raised. See, e.g., WHO CMH 2001, supra note 91; Troullier et al., supra note 91.
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databases and non-rival access to knowledge must be further studied and implemented. 171
Moreover, complete alternatives to the current scheme must be further studied to provide
the needed incentives to increase research and development of neglected diseases. Such
efforts include compulsory licensing or patent buy-outs, 172 employer-based payroll
taxes, 173 patent auctions 174 and well- funded research centers. 175
¶59
Currently, the development of public and private partnerships (PPPs) is one of the
most encouraging developments in the area. 176 PPPs are an innovative way to finance
creative solutions and encourage innovation. 177 More specifically, successful PPPs:
•
deliver critical funding;
•
draw attention to health threats that may not be widely known;
•
share knowledge and resources;
•
build the numbers needed to facilitate volume-related discounts; and
•
achieve specific public health disease management objectives. 178
¶60
In addition, it is widely believed that the probability of the success of PPPs is
enhanced when:
•
common performance measures are developed;
•
clinical trial capacity development is coordinated;
•
the potential of disease endemic countries is harnessed;
•
the financial stability of the PPPs is ensured;
•
the research, development and access components are communicated and
171

OECD 2004, supra note 150, at 23; DFID 2004, supra note 4; Outterson, supra note 166. Moreover,
the OECD has embraced economic-based reforms of patent regimes including “introducing a more
differentiated approach to patent protection that depends on specific characteristics of the inventions, such
as their life cycle or their value (as opposed to the current uniform system); making patent fees
commensurate to the degree of protection provided; and, developing alternatives to patenting such as the
public domain.” OECD 2004, supra note 150, at 6. For more analysis and alternatives, see John Barton,
Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE : DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 5-64 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003);
Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-development National Intellectual Property Policies, in TRADING
IN KNOWLEDGE : DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 209-18 (Christophe
Bellmann et al. eds., 2003); see also UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 59-60; WHO,
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 161-92 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf. It must be
recalled that alternatives are not likely to have much impact on the pharmaceutical industry (for instance,
Africa as a whole comprises only 1% of the world pharmaceuticals market). Moran, supra note 100, at 26.
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See, e.g., Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential Medicines to Poor
Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, 24 W ORLD ECON. 779 (2001).
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See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R & D, 2(2)
PLOS BIOLOGY e52 (2004), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=340954 (last
visited Jan. 3, 2007); Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 36
METAPHILOSOPHY 182, 182-209 (2005).
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See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q. J.
ECON. 1137 (1998).
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See, e.g., The Free Market Drug Act of 2004, H.R. 5155, 108th Cong. (2004). For more information,
see Congressman Kucinich’s website, Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich,
http://kucinich.house.gov/news/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=28571 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
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See, for example, the research by the Medicines for Malaria Venture, THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
NEGLECTED DISEASE DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at http://mmv.org/IMG/pdf/Chapter_2.pdf.
177
For basic information and stimulating questions, see W ORLD ECONOMIC FORUM AND THE UNITED
NATIONS FOUNDATION, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: M EETING IN THE MIDDLE (2003), available at
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/GHI_2003_Meeting_in_the_middle.pdf.
178
UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 54-55.

32

Vol. 5:1]

¶61

¶62

¶63

¶64

Bryan Mercurio

coordinated; and
•
industry contributions are fully recruited and involved. 179
While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop a model for increasing
research and development into these diseases, several useful models already exist and all
stress the need for cooperation between public, private, academic, philanthropic
foundations, government and international organisations. 180 All of these models stress
that increased financing, clear priorities, effective management and meaningful
technology and knowledge transfers are all necessary components to the equation. 181
Importantly, PPPs provide a viable solution to improving the public health crises
without the need to tackle the reform of intellectual property systems. Moreover, PPPs
address both the underlying problems of affordability and development by providing an
alternative to dependence on donations from governments and other organisations or
access to essential medicines from pharmaceutical companies. 182 Under the PPP model,
private companies provide technology as well as development and distribution expertise,
while the public sector partners fund development costs and help ensure the medicines
reach those who are most in need. 183 There is thus no set formula for PPPs and different
groups tend to focus on different (or multiple) access and development aspects; for
instance, some promote leadership and capacity building, others focus on educating the
public on intellectual property laws and promoting access to medicines and still others
focus on increasing regulatory bodies in the developing world to ensure safe and quality
medicines and increased registration. 184
By far, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one of if not the largest donors to
PPPs, supporting, among others, the Global Fund, WHO efforts and US agencies
providing access to medicines. 185 Significantly, the Gates Foundation provides grants and
rewards for discovery of new medicines to prevent, alleviate or treat developing county
illnesses and diseases. 186 The Gates Foundation also excels in the promotion of research
and development (such as clinical trials) currently lacking existing vaccines or
medicines. 187
By working together, the public and private sector, aid organisations and
government s have demonstrated the ability to positively influence the course of the
developing world. One example of a potential PPP success is the partnership initiative
between the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKlein, the University of Liverpool and
179

See ROY W IDDUS & KATHERINE W HITE, COMBATING DISEASES A SSOCIATED WITH POVERTY:
FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS 23 (Abr. ver. 2004), available at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/ippph/CombatingDiseases.pdf.
180
See, e.g., id. For some of the pharmaceutical industries’ contributions to these efforts, see UN
M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 138-39 (industry dissent).
181
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PUBLIC HEALTH 1-18 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002).
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 1-18 (Michael R. Reich ed., 2002).
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See id. at 4-5; UN M ILLENNIUM PROJECT 2005, supra note 1, at 46, 54-55, 60, 138.
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Interestingly, the first grant provided under this scheme was to a non-profit pharmaceutical company.
For more information, see Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
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the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and a £2.5 million grant from the
UK Government’s Department of International Development to research and launch the
malaria-treatment drug Lapdap. 188 This initiative highlights two important points, namely
that public funding can be used on a range of public policy initiatives to control and
relieve the overall health crisis, and second, that resources and attention do not need to be
predominantly placed on amending the current IP regulation which allow for viable
solutions to the lack of access to medicine problem. 189
¶65
Both the quantity of PPPs and funding to PPPs is increasing, but the majority of
initiatives – including the Global Fund and WHO efforts – remain under-funded. 190 This
is especially the case for the traditionally neglected diseases such as African
trypanosomiasis, Chagas and leishmaniasis. 191 While funding for these diseases is
improving, 192 a critical shortage remains. However, it cannot be stressed enough that in
order to be effective, aid programs must be coordinated and address issues surrounding
the governance, participation, procurement, prioritization and best practices of PPPs. 193
Sporadic, ad hoc, diffuse or uncoordinated aid or PPPs will not help alleviate the
suffering.
D. Differential pricing and the prevention of trade diversion
¶66

Parallel importation occurs when the patent holder sells a product to a buyer who
exports the product to a second buyer in another country. 194 Parallel importing of
products is an attractive option when the price of the imported product, taking into
account transportation and tariffs, is lower than the price of the same product legally
made or imported into the country. Parallel importation undercuts the ability of a patent
holder to engage in price discrimination, i.e., tiered pricing, across national borders and
can severely reduce profit levels of international companies. Importantly, the Doha
Declaration confirmed the existing right available under TRIPS that each WTO Member
may establish its own regime of exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 195 Parallel
importing is therefore not in and of itself a violatio n of TRIPS and many countries (both
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Id. at 59.
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For instance, the pharmaceutical company Roche donated technology to the Brazilian government to
manufacture effective medicines. Id.
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developed and developing) take advantage of this flexibility to import products such as
books and CDs. 196
¶67
The problem for the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals and related products is
that they are being distributed to developing countries at reduced prices or donated,
which also allows companies to charge a high price in developed countries able and
willing to meet the higher price. 197 This enables the companies to recoup the costs of
offering a lower price to those markets unable or unwilling to meet that same price, but
there is nothing to prevent the importing nation from exporting the drugs back to the
original market or any other market for profit. Of course, such conduct on the part of
developing countries would be against the spirit of the Doha Declaration and prevent the
goal of facilitating access to medicines from being reached. 198 Paragraph 4 of the
Implementation Agreement attempts to resolve the uncertainty, but it is a compromise
provision fraught with uncertainty. 199 Paragraph 4 attempts to balance the concerns of
both developed and developing countries by instructing importing countries to take
measures to prevent re-exportation, but leaves unclear the issue of to what extent an
importing country must act. 200 Instead, Paragraph 4 merely states that the measures must
be “reasonable,” “within their means,” and “proportionate to their administrative
capacities and to the risk of trade diversion.”201
¶68
In order to maintain price discrimination between developed countries that can
afford the medicines and developing countries that need the medicines, the supply of
pharmaceuticals at reduced prices must be conditioned on the fact that the drugs will be
used to ease their health crisis, not simply re-exported to a market willing to pay a higher
price for the drugs. While the Implementation Agreement is designed to avoid imposing
conditions that developing countries cannot meet while also encouraging them to take
responsibility to ensure that medicines reach their intended destinations, the ambiguity of
their responsibilities and the lack of repercussions following a breach could potentially
unsettle the system. Whether the risk is real or imagined, it is clear that the
pharmaceutical industry is concerned about the implications of pharmaceutical
arbitrage/diversion from low income markets to high income markets. 202 This fear, in
turn, impacts upon the willingness of the industry to donate or sell drugs at a reduced
price to the developing world. 203
196
In fact, the parties effectively did not reach agreement on the issue. In the end, the decision to allow
its operation resulted because the parties could not agree on how to govern its use or otherwise restrict its
use. See Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade
Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS. L.J.
353 (2004).
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For examples of pharmaceutical companies voluntarily licensing products to companies in
developing countries, see Adelman et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 112, at 5-6.
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199
For criticism, see Mercurio, supra note 16, at 244-45.
200
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See Implementation Agreement, supra note 45, at para. 4.
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Matthews, supra note 54, at 100.
203
One commentator claims that, “Empirically, such arbitrage is rarely observed, and need not be a
significant threat…” Outterson, supra note 160, at 257-60; but see HIV Drugs for Africa Diverted to
Europe, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 2002, at A10 (detailing how only ten percent of over $18 million dollars worth
of HIV/AIDS medication (sold to Africa at a discount of up to 90% ) sent from GlaxoSmithKline in Europe
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medication back to Europe).

35

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2006

¶69

In addition, while Paragraph 4 envisions developed countries assisting those
developing countries and LDCs that “experience[] difficulty” in preventing diversion, its
conditions and guidance are inadequate, only allowing developed countries to provide
technical and financial cooperation to prevent diversion “on request and on mutually
agreed terms and conditions” of the importing Member. 204 Therefore, if an importing
Member does nothing to prevent or encourages or even brokers a deal for the diversion of
medicines away from its citizens and into another market, other Members and/or the
patent holder cannot prevent the diversion (other than through their domestic
institutions). Such a system invites abuse and provides no stop mechanism. It would
seem appropriate for Members to have the ability to become involved in an effort to
prevent diversion, particularly if the importing Member is actively participating in such
diversion. At the very least, one would expect that the Implementation Agreement would
include a provision allowing aggrieved Members the right to complain to and refer the
matter to the Council for TRIPS. But the Implementation Agreement does not provide
for redress of diversion, instead viewing the measure’s only purpose to ensure medicines
reach their destination, and fails to provide property holders with any mechanism to
enforce their rights. 205
¶70
In not taking a stronger stand in the Implementation Agreement, WTO Members
missed an opportunity to effectively monitor the sale of pharmaceuticals to developing
countries (whether by compulsory or voluntary licensing or through price
discrimination). 206 For instance, the Council for TRIPS could monitor transactions and
better ensure not only that the drugs do not get re-exported but also that only minimal
economic, legal, and bureaucratic burdens are placed on the importing country. Such a
system, if properly designed, could have been workable and agreeable to all concerned
parties. 207 On the other hand, while preventing re- importation is the goal, any potential
solution cannot unduly raise developing country compliance costs. 208 In this regard, the
implementation concerns of developing countries are well- founded.
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See generally id.
206
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¶71

Therefore, while patent protection and TRIPS is not the cause of or even a
significant factor in worsening the public health crisis in the developing world, it is not a
perfect agreement and – if the pharmaceutical industry is to be believed – can be
amended to facilitate increased donations of essential medicines. Two possible solutions
are suggested for dealing with the shortcomings of TRIPS and the accompanying
agreements. First, TRIPS could be amended so as to allow for redress of diversion
through dispute settlement. This suggestion concededly has many flaws, but a possible
solution to halting existing and preventing further trade diversion may lie in setting up an
effective dispute settlement scheme or allowing the existing system to hear cases where
Members who have acquired drugs under a license or through price
discrimination/donation based on their economic and public health needs are exporting
the drugs for profit. It must be acknowledged, however, that Articles 28 and 5 of TRIPS
and Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration may perhaps impede such a solution as they
do not permit Members from challenging schemes dealing with the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.
¶72
Of course, even if TRIPS was amended to allow dispute settlement over
diversionary issues, an additional barrier exists on the practical matter of how to monitor
such trade diversionary practices. One possibility would be for a body to be established
to monitor possible trade diversions, 209 but this would be a costly endeavor as
considerable funding would be required to set up such an international watchdog. It
would seem more practical for that funding to be diverted into more essential areas such
as building infrastructure and alternative solutions to the trade diversion problem.
¶73
A more practical solution to the problem would seem to be through simple
amendments to TRIPS. For example, Sykes suggests that amendments to TRIPS could
be made which permit sectoral agreements on the exhaustion issue depending on the
product in order to discourage or prohibit parallel imports of pharmaceuticals. 210
However, it is well known that consensus decision making in the WTO significantly
impedes progress or amendments of any kind. 211 For instance, one must remember that
Members negotiated for over two years to reach a consensus to a solution on the
Paragraph 6 issue of the Doha Declaration and it seems unlikely that any revision of
TRIPS will be any easier. 212
¶74
That being said, there may be potential in the future to adopt a regime which is
similar to the system currently operating in the EU. The EU uses its own regional
exhaustion of rights doctrine to prohibit imports of cheaper patented drugs from outside
the EU. 213 The EU arrangements differ from the system agreed by the WTO in the
Implementation Agreement in that the EU scheme protects the interests of patent holding
proprietary pharmaceutical companies by deterring trade diversion of low-cost drugs they
209
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210
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211
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BRIEFS 2 (2000); Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 NW . J. INT ’L
L. & BUS. 653, 661 (1996-97).
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37

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2006

have made available. 214 Under the EU arrangements, exporting drug companies may
apply to the Commission for permission to put their medicines onto a tiered price list,
selling them to developing countries at a fraction of the factory price. 215 Re-importation
of these drugs is prohibited from 76 least-developed and developing countries. In order
to facilitate the agreement, the drugs listed carry a logo so that they are identifiable by
customs authorities examining imports at the EU borders. 216
¶75
Practically, the EU approach is more favorable than the current multinational
approach for several reasons. First, it protects the patent- holding pharmaceutical
companies directly and provides incentives, through the safeguards imposed, for these
companies to provide discounted drugs to the developing world. 217 Second, the cost of
the EU approach may prove to be significantly less than the current administrative and
procedural costs under the WTO scheme as the EU scheme only requires that the
products listed carry a particular logo. 218 Perhaps on the global scale, each region of the
developed world participating in such a scheme, for example, North America,
Australasia, etc., may have its own logo to identify that particular region. If the EU
scheme proves both effective at encouraging the export of discounted pharmaceuticals to
the developing world while also preventing diversion back into the market, or into
another market, it may provide the evidence needed to amend Article 6 of TRIPS and
sanction a uniform and non-discretionary scheme to prevent the diversion of trade.
V. CONCLUSION
¶76

This article demonstrates that the TRIPS regime of patent protection does not fully
explain why one-third of the world’s poor lack access to essential medicines. The public
health crises plaguing much of the developing world are a large-scale global problem, but
it is a problem for which there is a global solution. 219 The developed world has a duty to
the countries suffering public health problems and, in doing so, must address several
factors, including funding, medical infrastructure, education, and intellectual property
regulations. Although seemingly forgotten, it is important to realize that the issue of
global access to medicine requires measures and policies much broader than simply
amending global intellectual property protection. In the current situation, many of the
developing countries experiencing public health crisis cannot even afford to buy and
distribute pharmaceutical products that are off-patent, let alone warehouse, store and
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administer the drugs and vaccines donated by the pharmaceutical companies. 220 This is
the reality they face and in this reality we must ask if the issuance of compulsory
licenses, or otherwise allowing access to patented pharmaceutical products, will do any
good.
¶77
Numerous diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, are at an
epidemic level in many developing countries, and yet commercial research and
development of essential medicines to prevent or treat these ailments (less HIV/AIDS) is
almost non-existent. 221 The reason for this is simple: it does not make good economic
sense for any industry to pour money into a product that does not have at least a promise
of return and the countries afflicting with these diseases do not have the ability to pay for
any new medical and treatment options. Thus, under the current structure, incentives to
research into the area of diseases afflicting the developing world are almost non-existent.
Therefore, while TRIPS allows for countries to issue a compulsory license to acquire
needed drugs, there is sometimes no drug on the market to alleviate the problem due to
lack of research and development. 222
¶78
Developing countries themselves do not, in the main, have the incentives or ability
to fund, develop and distribute new drugs. Thus, patent protection must ensure that the
pharmaceutical industry's incentive to create remains strong. If properly administered, a
system of intellectual property rights, combined with a compulsory licensing regime
could strike the appropriate balance. 223 On the other hand, a system of intellectual
property that guarantees no return on investment and allows for the expropriation of
intellectual property rights without proper compensation or enforceable limits will reduce
the incentive to research and invest into the area and exacerbate the relative dearth in
medicines for “third world” diseases. Such a situation must be avoided. But another,
possibly larger, problem is that the current system of patent protection does not create the
incentives necessary to encourage research and development into diseases for which there
is little or no possibility for return. Instead, diseases primarily afflicting the developing
world – including but not limited to malaria and tuberculosis – remain under- funded. 224 It
is, therefore, incumbent upon the governments of the developed world to provide
incentives to the pharmaceutical industry to research and develop treatments and vaccines
for these neglected diseases, directly fund the research and develop treatments and
220
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vaccines themselves, or totally recalibrate the patent system for traditionally neglected
diseases.
¶79
Simply stated, the current system does not provide incentives to research
developing country diseases. 225 But the patent system alone is not the problem, as
pharmaceutical companies have in recent years expended significant resources to combat
diseases which afflict both the developed and developing world (such as HIV/AIDS) and
the disparity between the two groups of nations has increased in recent years. 226 Even
more important than the current system of IPRs to the lack of access to medicines and
corresponding health crises in the developing world is one of funding: developing
countries do not have adequate resources, developing countries misallocate resources,
international support is inadequate and the levels of research and development into
diseases afflicting the developing world is insufficient. 227 As Attaran and Gillespie-White
conclude:
“[A] variety of de facto barriers are more responsible for impeding access
to antiretroviral treatment, including but not limited to the poverty of
African countries, the high cost of antiretroviral treatment, national
regulatory requirements for medicines, tariffs and sales taxes, and, above
all, a lack of sufficient international financial aid to fund antiretroviral
treatment.”228
¶80

Therefore, while a solution to alleviating the public health crises currently
tormenting much of the developing world is achievable, such a solution cannot be
attained by merely amending, or even abandoning, TRIPS and patent laws or by
implementing only one of the initiatives outlined above. This is especially the case given
that while over 95% of the WHO Essential Drugs List is off-patent, these inflictions and
diseases continue to decimate much of the developing world. 229 The initiatives suggested
in this article must be explored in combination to tackle the twin problems of inadequate
development of vaccines and drugs and access to existing vaccines and drugs facing
developing countries. Developed countries and the international community must
increase both the amount as well as the coordination of funding and aid activities,
developing countries must prioritize public health, improve infrastructure and work
towards creating an environment conducive to growth and sustainability, and alternatives
to current research and development schemes (such as alternatives to patents, the further
development of PPPs and the provision of research incentives/subsidies to the
pharmaceutical industry) must be studied and implemented. It is only then when, through
global commitment from the entire international community, that the public health crises
may be alleviated and suffering end.
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